自我优待的反垄断规制问题  

The Anti-trust Regulation Issues of Self-preferencing

作　　者：丁茂中 DING Maozhong(Economic Law School,Shanghai University of Political Science and law,Shanghai 201701,China)

机构地区：[1]上海政法学院经济法学院,上海201701

出　　处：《法学论坛》2022年第4期87-97,共11页Legal Forum

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目《适应新时代市场监管需要的权力配置研究》(20&ZD194)的阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：美国众议院司法委员会2020年发布的《数字市场竞争调查》直接将自我优待与掠夺性定价、排他性交易列为平台进行市场力量传导的手段,这种做法缺乏必要的科学性。范畴的不明确和可能涉嫌的垄断行为主要类型客观决定了无法对自我优待直接适用本身违法原则进行定性。要认定自我优待构成滥用市场支配地位,就必须按照滥用市场支配地位的构成要件进行规范分析。在构成要件上,滥用市场支配地位存在三要件和四要件两种潜在的选择。根据以往经验来看,大型以上的互联网平台采取一些特定举措确实会影响到市场公平竞争,应当是反垄断执法机构关注的重点。但是因为滥用市场支配地位的法律认定往往会存在一定程度的不确定性,所以有必要对自我优待的竞争合规作出进一步的指引。As means of platform market power conduction, self-preferencing is directly listed on Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets in 2020 by The U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary along with predatory pricing and exclusive dealing, which lacks the necessary scientific rigor. Objectively, the vague concept and an antitrust suspect identity decide on a failure of qualitative analysis about how to directly apply per se violation principle to self-preferencing. To determine that self-preferencing constitutes an abuse of dominant market position, it is necessary to conduct a normative analysis in accordance with the constitutive elements of abuse of dominant market position. In terms of the constitutive elements, there are two potential options for abuse of market dominance, the three elements theory and the four elements theory. Based on the past experience in antitrust practice, it is true that some specific initiatives taken by Internet platforms giants can easily affect fair competition in the market, which should be focused by antitrust enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, there is some extent to legal uncertain that identifying abuse of dominant market position behavior, therefore antitrust enforcement agencies necessarily provide further competition compliance guidance on self-preferencing.

关 键 词：自我优待 竞争规制 本身违法原则 合理原则 

分 类 号：DF414[政治法律—经济法学]