潜产权的形成、可能的冲突及其处置——基于巴泽尔产权思想的博弈分析  

The Formation, Possible Conflict and Countermeasures of the Potential Property Right——Game Based on Barzel’s Thought of Property Right

作　　者：戴静超 黄少安[2] Dai Jingchao;Huang Shaoan(Business School,Hebei Normal University,Shijiazhuang Hebei 050024,China;Center for Economic Research,Shandong University,Jinan Shandong 250100,China)

机构地区：[1]河北师范大学商学院,河北石家庄050024 [2]山东大学经济研究院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《河北经贸大学学报》2022年第4期34-45,共12页Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business

基　　金：中共中央宣传部“四个一批”人才项目“中国经济体制改革和经济发展的理论总结”;河北师范大学人文社会科学基金“区域创新生态系统视域下中国特色知识产权文化与企业创新研究”(S21B025)。

摘　　要：长期占据的教室座位、临街摊位等默认为“先占者”的专属座位或摊位,这类现象便是“潜产权”,即产权已建立情况下,产权主体使用财产时出现的一种潜在权利。基于巴泽尔产权思想、奥尔森集体行动理论等设计博弈模型,分析产权属性分离、非正式制度(先占原则等)、集体行动困境等对潜产权形成所发挥的作用;研究发现,财产使用权附加价值提升到一定程度时,可能会打破集体行动困境,进而引发抵制潜产权、争夺使用权的权利纠纷。但无论是默认潜产权使得财产使用权无法重回公共领域,还是抵制潜产权而付出集体行动成本,均是有失公平或缺乏效率的非最优结果。故财产法定所有者(或政府等)可通过收费或惩处等方式确保权利完整、消除潜产权并达到社会最优。Long-occupied classroom seats and street stalls are often regarded as the exclusive seats or stalls of the "preemptors" by default, and such phenomena are "potential property rights", which are established during the process of using the property. The game models are designed based on Barzel’s thought of property rights, Olson’s theory of collective action, etc., to explore the role played by the separation of property rights attributes, informal institutions(principle of preemption, etc.), and collective action dilemma on the formation of potential property rights. The results show that when the added value of the right to use property increases to a certain extent, it may break the dilemma of collective action, and then lead to rights disputes to resist potential property rights and compete for access. However, both the existence of potential property rights, which prevents the right to use property from returning to the public domain, and the resistance to potential property rights, which need the cost of collective action, are non-optimal outcomes that are inequitable or inefficient. Therefore, the legal owner of the property(or the government, etc.) can ensure the integrity of the rights, eliminate the potential property rights and achieve the social optimal game results through charging or penalty system.

关 键 词：潜产权 巴泽尔 奥尔森 非正式制度 集体行动 博弈 

分 类 号：F041[经济管理—政治经济学]