Do deep pockets have more political influence?—the size of private enterprises and their strategy selection in resolving administrative disputes  

作　　者：Yingying Ji Xiaoguang Fan 

机构地区：[1]Shanghai University,Shangda Road 99,Shanghai,China [2]Zhejiang University,Yuhangtang Road 866,Hangzhou,Zhejiang,China

出　　处：《The Journal of Chinese Sociology》2019年第1期20-39,共20页中国社会学杂志（英文）

基　　金：supported by the National(China)Social Science Foundation(Grant no.17CSH074,The Publicity of Social Organization and its Influence on Grassroots Governance in Urban China).

摘　　要：Fitting multivariate models to the China Private Enterprises Survey(2006)data,this article reveals the differentiation of state-business relationship as a function of a private enterprise’s economic capital,thereby to a certain extend challenges the dominant paradigm of clientelism.When resolving disputes with the government,private enterprises with more economic capital are more likely to directly contact the government agency,displaying greater political privilege.On the other hand,private enterprises with middle-range economic capital show higher preference to take advantage of business associations or particularistic relationships.However,instead of economic capital,it is the Communist Party membership of private entrepreneurs that influences their contentious strategies.There is also regional variation in the selection of strategies.This article casts doubt on the existence of a“capitalist class”in China.Under the specific context of the Chinese society,characteristics of the private economy influence the path by which economic power transforms to political power.

关 键 词：Economic capital CLIENTELISM State-business relationship Bargaining power Business associations 

分 类 号：F42[经济管理—产业经济]