考虑政府参与的环境NGO与WEEE处理商演化博弈研究  

Research on the Evolutionary Game of Environmental NGO and WEEE Processors Considering Government Participation

作　　者：孙珂珂 张海珍 李鑫 SUN Ke-ke;ZHANG Hai-zhen;LI Xin(Business School, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266061, China;Business Administration School of Heze University, Heze 274000, China)

机构地区：[1]青岛大学商学院,青岛266061 [2]菏泽学院商学院,菏泽274000

出　　处：《青岛大学学报（自然科学版）》2022年第2期92-98,共7页Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(批准号:71974104)资助。

摘　　要：针对环境NGO与WEEE处理商的策略选择问题,考虑政府参与,构建环境NGO与WEEE处理商之间的演化博弈模型。通过分析系统稳定策略及条件,研究不同情形下影响双方选择策略的主要因素,基于Matlab进行数值仿真分析。研究结果表明,政府和消费者的参与能有效激励环境NGO和处理商实现废旧家电从消极处置到无害化处理的演进,且演化速度与惩罚强度、扶持力度等因素呈正相关,与监管成本、转型成本等因素呈负相关。政府惩罚力度的提高促使环境NGO与WEEE处理商积极开展策略转型,主动选择环境友好型决策,从而避免高额环境惩罚成本带来的利润损失。Considering government participation,an evolutionary game model between environmental NGO and WEEE processors was constructed to study the strategic choice between them.The influencing factors of the two parties'choice strategies were explored by analyzing stable strategies of the system and conditions,which used Matlab for numerical simulation analysis.The results show that the participation of the government and consumers can effectively encourage environmental NGO and processors to realize the evolution from the passive disposal of used household appliances to the harmless disposal.The speed of evolution is positively correlated with factors such as the intensity of punishment and support,and negatively correlated with factors such as supervision costs and transformation costs.The increase in government punishment has prompted environmental NGO and WEEE processors to actively carry out strategic transformations.Environmental NGO and WEEE processors are encouraged to actively choose environmentally friendly decisions,so as to avoid profit losses caused by high environmental penalty costs.

关 键 词：策略选择 政府 回收处理模式 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F426