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作 者:杜海龙 邵霞 张卫党[3] DU Hailong;SHAO Xia;ZHANG Weidang(School of Electronic Information Engineering,Zhengzhou Sias University,Zhengzhou 451150,China;School of Physics and Electronics,North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power,Zhengzhou 450046,China;School of Information Engineering,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China)
机构地区:[1]郑州西亚斯学院电子信息工程学院,郑州451150 [2]华北水利水电大学物理与电子学院,郑州450046 [3]郑州大学信息工程学院,郑州450001
出 处:《电讯技术》2022年第7期922-928,共7页Telecommunication Engineering
基 金:河南省科技攻关项目(212102210568,202102310201)。
摘 要:采用随机几何和博弈论相结合的方法,研究了蜂窝网络中用户对于移动网络运营商(Wireless Service Provider,WSP)的选择与WSP频谱分配方案的制定之间的联系;构建了一个层次化的博弈框架来模拟用户和WSP之间的复杂交互,采用演化博弈模型来描述用户之间的竞争,用非合作博弈模型来描述WSP之间的竞争,用多领导者多跟随者的Stackelberg博弈模型来描述用户和运营商之间的循环依赖问题;分析了演化博弈模型中演化均衡的存在及其渐近稳定性,并在此基础上证明了非合作博弈模型中纳什均衡的存在。The combination between the selection of wireless service provider(WSP)by users and the formation of spectrum allocation schemes of WSPs is studied by taking the approach of uniting stochastic geometry and game theory.A hierarchical game framework is built to simulate the complex interaction between users and WSPs.Wherein,the evolutionary game,the non-cooperative game and multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game models are adopted to formulate the competition between users,competition between WSPs and the cyclic dependence between users and WSPs,respectively.The existence of evolutionary equilibrium and its stability in the evolutionary game model are analyzed.On this basis,the existence of Nash equilibrium in the non-cooperative game model is proved.
分 类 号:TN925[电子电信—通信与信息系统]
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