地区重点企业水污染减排复合政策模拟研究  

Simulation study on the compound policy of water pollution reduction of regional key enterprises

作　　者：周申蓓[1,2,3] 王晓静 陈松峰 段也晴[1] ZHOU Shenbei;WANG Xiaojing;CHEN Songfeng;DUAN Yeqing(Business School,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China;Institute Research of Water Economy,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China;Global Environment and Natural Resources Institute,George Mason University,Fairfax,VA 22030,USA;Jiangsu Water Resources Service Center,Nanjing 210029,China)

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,江苏南京211100 [2]河海大学水利经济研究所,江苏南京211100 [3]乔治梅森大学资源环境研究所,维吉尼亚费尔法克斯22030 [4]江苏省水资源服务中心,江苏南京210029

出　　处：《水利经济》2022年第4期17-22,40,91,92,共9页Journal of Economics of Water Resources

基　　金：国家重点研发计划(2019YFC0409000)。

摘　　要：在水污染排放税和排放权交易市场并行的现实政策情景下,模拟复合政策对地区重点企业的排放权配置结构、产量、利润和社会福利的影响,并探索实现社会福利和企业创新减排利润同时最优的政策区间。研究发现:相比于排放税,企业利润对排放权价格变化更为敏感;企业最优的从市场取得的排放权相对于超排量的比例与利润之间呈倒U形关系;在排放税税率与排放权单价的价差较小,且排放税率略低于排放权价格时,可实现经济与环境的双赢。为了使复合政策的效率最大化,建议减排政策中应避免排放税和排放权同低或同高的情形。Under the compound policy scenario of water pollution emission tax and rights trading market,the complex impact of tax rights policies on the tax rights allocation structure,output,profit and social welfare was simulated.On this basis,the optimal policy interval for promoting enterprise to innovate was proposed.The findings are as follows.Compared with emission taxes,corporate profits are more sensitive to the price of emission rights.There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the optimal ratio of emission rights obtained from the market to excess emissions and profits.When the price difference between the emission tax rate and the emission right unit price is small,and the emission tax rate is slightly lower than the emission right price,a win-win situation between the economy and the environment can be achieved.The research conclusion shows that in order to maximize the efficiency of the composite policy,the situation that the emission tax and the emission right are both low or high should be avoided in the emission reduction policy.

关 键 词：水污染 排放税 排放权 配置结构 减排策略 

分 类 号：F062.1[经济管理—政治经济学]