基于合作博弈论的日前自备电厂与风电发电权交易模型  

Cooperation Game Theory-based Model for Trading of Power Generation Rights Between Former Captive Power Plants and Wind Power

作　　者：刘文霞 王丽娜 张帅 李承泽 王斯娴 王月汉 LIU Wenxia;WANG Lina;ZHANG Shuai;LI Chengze;WANG Sixian;WANG Yuehan(State Key Laboratory of Alternate Electrical Power System With Renewable Energy Sources(North China Electric Power University),Changping District,Beijing 102206,China)

机构地区：[1]新能源电力系统国家重点实验室(华北电力大学),北京市昌平区102206

出　　处：《电网技术》2022年第7期2647-2656,共10页Power System Technology

基　　金：国家重点研发计划项目(2020YFC0827001)。

摘　　要：为激发自备电厂发电权交易潜力,提出了一种基于合作博弈论的日前自备电厂与风电发电权交易模型。首先,针对日前预测的弃风时段,论述了自备电厂和风电合作博弈的空间和策略,提出了等效调峰补偿机制,并结合碳减排收益和配额收益,建立了以自备电厂和风电场联盟净收益最大为目标的合作博弈模型。其次,通过分析交易主盟净收益最大为目标的合作博弈模型及交易主体对联盟的贡献,建立了多因素改进的Shapley值利润分配模型。然后,采用广义析取规划方法和分段线性化方法,将非线性模型转化为混合整数线性模型进行求解。最后,算例验证了模型的正确性,并探究了煤炭价格和调峰补偿系数对交易的影响。To stimulate the power trading potential of captive power plants,this paper proposes a cooperative game theory-based model of the day-ahead power generation rights trading between captive power plants and wind power.Firstly,the space and strategy of the cooperative game between the captive power plants and wind power are discussed according to the wind-abandoned hours predicted a few days ago,and the equivalent peaking compensation mechanism is proposed.Combined with the carbon emission reduction gain and the quota gain,a cooperative game model with the goal of maximizing the net gain of the captive power plants and wind farm alliance is established.A multi-factor improved Shapley value profit distribution model is established by analyzing the contributions of the trading agents to the alliance.Next,the proposed nonlinear model is solved by transforming it into a mixed-integer linear model using the generalized disjunctive programming and segmented linearization.Finally,the arithmetic example verifies the correctness of the model,and the effects of coal prices and peaking compensation factors on trading are explored.

关 键 词：发电权交易 合作博弈 改进Shapley值 混合整数线性模型 

分 类 号：TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]