审计质量对企业担保掏空行为抑制效应研究  

Research on the Effect of Audit Quality on Inhibiting Firms'Tunneling Behavior of Loan Guarantees

作　　者：王梦迪 冷奥琳 郭菊娥[1] Wang Mengdi;Leng Aolin;Guo Ju'e(School of Management,Xi'an Jiaotong University,Xi'an 710049;School of Management,Northwestern Polytechnical University,Xi'an 710072)

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,西安710049 [2]西北工业大学管理学院,西安710072

出　　处：《管理评论》2022年第5期235-251,共17页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71803151)。

摘　　要：本文研究审计质量是否能够抑制企业利用担保的掏空行为。理论推理给出外部审计质量影响担保掏空行为的机理模型,利用我国上市公司2007—2016年担保事件数据,以担保公告日前后累计异常收益率变化的事件研究法来判断公司利用担保的掏空程度,缓解了以往截面数据研究中将正常交易行为列入到掏空范围的第二类统计学错误。实证检验发现:(1)提高审计投入质量(高质量的会计师事务所)不能提高提供担保事件的累计异常收益率;(2)含有担保事项描述的非标准审计意见会显著增加公司下一年度提供担保的累计异常收益率。研究结果表明,高质量外部审计无法通过治理作用来抑制担保掏空行为,而审计师在出具的审计意见中披露担保行为对上市公司的担保掏空现象具有事后信息威慑作用。In this paper,we study whether audit quality can inhibit companies'tunneling behaviors of providing loan guarantees.Firstly,this paper presents a theoretical mechanism model which shows the impact of external audit quality on tunneling behavior through loan guarantees.Secondly,based on guarantee events data of Chinese listed companies during 2007 to 2016,this paper calculates the cumulative abnormal return(CAR)before and after guarantee announcement days to measure the extent of tunneling.The measurement method of tunneling in our paper can alleviate type II statistical error,which appears when normal transactions are tunneling transactions are confused in the previous cross-sectional researches.The empirical tests find that(1)higher input-based audit quality(i.e.hiring high-quality accounting firms)cannot improve the CAR of guarantee events,and(2)modified audit opinions with guarantee statements significantly increase the CAR of guarantee events in the next accounting year.The results imply that just by playing its governing role,high-quality auditing cannot restrain large shareholders from tunneling,while releasing guarantee information in the audit opinion has an ex-post deterrent effect on listed firms that are intent on tunneling by guarantees.

关 键 词：审计质量 提供担保 掏空 累计异常收益率 审计意见 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F239.4