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作 者:李辉 Li Hui
机构地区:[1]中国海洋大学国际事务与公共管理学院,山东青岛266100
出 处:《学海》2022年第4期126-134,146,共10页Academia Bimestris
基 金:国家社科基金一般项目“地方政府区域合作中纵向介入的控制权配置研究”(项目号:21BZX007)的阶段性成果。
摘 要:与“趋利型”府际合作相比,“避害型”府际合作面临着更为复杂的集体行动困境,也更需要中央政府的纵向介入。本文遵循“集体性-选择性”“收益-损害”两种逻辑,对地方政府区域合作动机进行“二维-四分”的阐释,构建起关键行动者和合作动机的整合性框架。研究发现,“集体性损害≠选择性损害”是“避害型”府际合作困境的根源,包括合法性问题、理性主义陷阱、外部性困境以及合作成本障碍。纵向介入的工具和机制包括以纵向授权解决合法性困境的保障型介入、以纵向沟通规避理性主义陷阱的信息型介入、以纵向统合回应外部性困境的权威型介入、以纵向命令反制合作成本障碍的强制型介入。不同的介入方式形塑了“避害型”府际合作的不同生成模式,包括自主探索型、应景响应型、压力回应型、命令强制型、直接组织型。针对不同程度的府际合作困境选择恰当的介入工具和机制,有利于准确把握纵向介入的尺度,以最小介入成本达到促进府际合作的效用。Compared with“profit-oriented”cooperation,“damage-avoided”inter-governmental cooperation faces more complex collective action dilemmas and requires more vertical intervention from the central government.The paper follows two kinds of logic of“collective-selective”and“benefit-damage”to interpret the motives of inter-governmental cooperation in a“two-dimensional-quadratic”manner and construct an integrated framework of key actors and motives for cooperation.The study finds that collective damage is not the same as selective harm,which is the root cause of the“damage-avoided”inter-governmental cooperation dilemma,including legitimacy problems,rationalism traps,externality dilemmas,and barriers to cooperation costs.The tools and mechanisms of vertical interventions include safeguard interventions to solve legitimacy dilemmas through vertical authorization,information interventions to avoid rationalism traps through vertical communication,authority interventions to respond to externality dilemmas through vertical integration,and coercive interventions to counteract cost barriers to cooperation through vertical orders.Different interventions shape the generation of“damage-avoided”inter-governmental cooperation,including autonomous exploration,responsive,pressure-responsive,command-compulsory,and direct organization.The selection of appropriate intervention tools and mechanisms for different degrees of inter-governmental cooperation dilemmas is conducive to accurately grasping the scale of vertical intervention and achieving the effectiveness of promoting inter-governmental cooperation with minimal intervention costs.
关 键 词:地方政府合作 “避害型”府际合作 纵向介入 京津冀大气污染联防联控
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