疫情影响下的应急物资供应链与政府调控措施  

Supply Chain of Emergency Goods under Epidemic and Government Measures for Social Welfare

作　　者：赵古月 ZHAO Guyue(Antai College of Economics&Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China)

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《上海管理科学》2022年第4期20-27,共8页Shanghai Management Science

摘　　要：疫情的发生对许多商品的供应链产生了突发影响,尤其是与疫情息息相关的应急物资,在需求增长和供给受限的情况下往往供不应求。通过应急物资供应链的博弈模型可以得出,在特定情况下,供应链中企业利益与社会疫情防控利益存在冲突可能,而政府采取措施可以更好地保障应急物资供应。在创新性地将政府调控措施加入博弈模型后,求解不同措施下政府的最优决策以及最优化的社会福利,并通过模型和算例分析,对比在不同条件下政府实行不同措施的效果,得出在单供应商、单零售商的供应链中,政府给予供应商补贴和给予零售商补贴的效果是相同的;疫情越严重,政府调用公共物资的措施越倾向于更优。这些措施的对比与建议具有较大的现实意义。The outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic has a sudden impact on the supply chain of many commodities,especially emergency goods.The supply of these goods is limited while the demand is increasing sharply.From the game model of the supply chain of these goods,it can be concluded that under certain circumstances,the interests of enterprises in the supply chain may conflict with the interests of social epidemic prevention and control.Government measures may better guarantee the supply of emergency goods.Innovatively adding the government regulation measures into the game model,the optimal decisions of the government under different measures are solved.By analyzing the model results and example cases,the effects of different measures implemented by the government under different conditions are compared.It can be concluded that in the supply chain of single supplier and single retailer,the effects of government subsidies to the supplier or to the retailer are the same.If the epidemic situation is serious enough,the better measure for the government is to transfer public goods for social supply.The suggestions provided are practically significant.

关 键 词：应急供应链管理 斯塔克伯格博弈 社会福利 政府调控 

分 类 号：F25[经济管理—国民经济]