三方博弈下的最优反倾销税率模型  

Optimal Anti-dumping Tax Rate Model under the Tripartite Game

作　　者：朱依蕾 ZHU Yilei(Antai College of Economics&Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China)

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《上海管理科学》2022年第4期59-63,共5页Shanghai Management Science

摘　　要：基于国有企业、国内民营企业和国外企业在国内市场上同时竞争的博弈框架,构建了包含征收反倾销税的外部性和国有企业市场化程度的最优反倾销税率模型。通过对模型的解析,得到反倾销税与国企市场化程度对产量、企业利润和消费者剩余以及最优反倾销税率的影响因素,并分析了各影响因素如何对反倾销税率产生作用。与先前的研究不同,研究发现各影响因素对反倾销税率的作用效果与反倾销外部性的大小和国企市场化程度有关。Based on the game framework of a state-owned enterprise,a domestic private enterprise and a foreign enterprise competing in the domestic market simultaneously,the optimal antidumping duty rate model including the externality of antidumping duty and the marketization degree of state-owned enterprise is constructed.By analyzing the model,the influence of antidumping duty and state-owned enterprise marketization on production,corporate profit and consumer surplus as well as the influencing factors of optimal antidumping duty rate are obtained.Besides,how these factors impact on optimal antidumping duty rate are analyzed.What is different from previous studies is that the relationship between the externality of antidumping and the marketization degree of state-owned enterprise matters to the effects of various influencing factors on anti-dumping tax rate.

关 键 词：反倾销税 国企市场化 外部性 优化模型 

分 类 号：F74[经济管理—国际贸易]