要素投入效率情景下药品质量监管演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary game analysis of drug quality supervision under the factor input efficiency scenario

作　　者：金浩[1] 刘德民 安明 Jin Hao;Liu Demin;An Ming(School of Economics and Management,Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin 300401,China)

机构地区：[1]河北工业大学经济管理学院,天津300401

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2022年第3期303-316,共14页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71573142);国家社会科学基金资助项目(19BGL054).

摘　　要：研究药品生产供应链质量安全投入过程中考虑节点企业不同要素投入效率的政府监管机制.基于柯布–道格拉斯生产函数刻画企业质量安全投入,构建了“药品原辅料供应商–药品生产商”演化博弈模型,着重探讨了要素投入效率对双方博弈策略选择结果的影响.结果表明,要素投入弹性系数影响了系统达到稳定所需时长,劳动弹性系数越大系统达到稳定时间越短.此外,主要要素投入较少、综合技术水平较低的药品供应链节点企业,在质量安全投入方面采用“搭便车”策略的概率更大,对此类企业采用严格的监管惩罚力度,可有效提升药品质量安全.This paper studies government supervision mechanism in the process of the quality safety investment in drugs production supply chains,considering node enterprise’s input efficiency of different elements.Using Cobb-Douglas production function to depict the quality safety investment of enterprises,this paper develops an evolutionary game model between the drug raw material supplier and drug manufacturer.The influence of the element input efficiency on the strategy choices of both sides is analyzed.Results show that the element input elasticity coefficient affects the time required for the system to reach the stability:the larger the labor elasticity coefficient,the shorter the system to reach the stability.In addition,the lower the main element input and the lower the comprehensive technical level of the drug supply chain node enterprise,the greater the probability of adopting the“hitching a ride”strategy in quality and safety input.Strict supervision punishment for such enterprises can be adopted to effectively improve the quality and safety of drugs.

关 键 词：药品质量安全 演化博弈 监管 柯布–道格拉斯生产函数 

分 类 号：TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]