公众参与环境污染第三方治理:利益博弈与法制完善  

Public Participation in Environmental Pollution Third-party Governance:Interest Game and Legal Perfection

作　　者：任卓冉[1] Ren Zhuoran

机构地区：[1]江南大学法学院,江苏无锡214122

出　　处：《河南大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第4期52-57,153,共7页Journal of Henan University(Social Sciences）

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“环境污染第三方治理法律制度完善研究”(19CFX078)阶段性成果。

摘　　要：完善的公众参与对于环境污染第三方治理的良性发展意义重大。以博弈论为分析工具,对环境污染第三方治理参与主体之间的利益博弈过程进行分析,可以发现公众参与囚徒困境的原因在于政府权威型治理下的逻辑悖论、公众参与环境治理上的权力缺失,以及私人部门引入公众参与的内生动力不足。对此,从利益博弈的角度出发,应推动环境治理向公共治理模式转型,建立公众参与环境利益分配制衡机制的基本框架,同时通过具体制度的设置引导公众、政府、私人部门的利益选择,真正实现环境污染第三方治理中的公共参与。Third-party governance of environmental pollution is an important part of modern environmental governance system,and perfect public participation is very important for its healthy development.With game theory as an analytical tool,the process of interest game among the participants in the environmental pollution third-party governance can be analyzed.The reasons for the Prisoner’s Dilemma of Public Participation are the logic paradox of the government’s authoritative governance,the lack of the public’s right to participate in environmental governance,and the lack of endogenous motivation for the private sector to introduce public participation.Therefore,from the perspective of interest game,it is necessary to promote the real transformation of environmental governance to public governance mode,establish the basic framework of the balance mechanism of environmental benefit distribution,and guide the public,government and enterprises to choose the interests through the setting of specific systems,so as to realize the public participation in the third-party environmental pollution governance.

关 键 词：环境污染 第三方治理 公众参与 利益博弈 

分 类 号：D912.6[政治法律—环境与资源保护法学]