地区竞争下县域政府治理偏好与差异  

Preference and Difference of County Government Governance under Regional Competition

作　　者：章韬[1] 李世林 苏慧 Zhang Tao;Li Shilin;Su Hui(School of International Business,Shanghai University of International Business and Economics.;School of Finance,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics.)

机构地区：[1]上海对外经贸大学国际经贸学院,上海201600 [2]上海财经大学金融学院,上海200433

出　　处：《经济科学》2022年第4期78-91,共14页Economic Science

摘　　要：财政分权制度促进了本地经济发展,也加剧了地方竞争。基于央地财政激励安排和地方治理约束条件,本文识别并估计了县域政府竞争水平和治理特征。研究发现,地方政府之间的竞争存在以下两种效果:第一,能够促进本地经济发展和人均收入增长;第二,地方政府倾向于为本地提供生产性公共品而非福利性公共品。由此,本文提出政策建议,上级政府在转移支付中应考虑扩大福利性公共品专项使用的比例。The fiscal decentralization system promotes the development of the local economy while aggravating inter-regional competition. Under the circumstances of fiscal incentive arrangement and local governance constraints, this paper investigates the characteristics and mechanisms of county-level government competition and governance. We find two effects of inter-regional competition. Specifically, local governments are more inclined to promote economic development and residents’ wealth growth, and local governments are more willing to provide productive public goods rather than welfare public goods. This paper implies that the government at higher levels should increase the general welfare expenditure of the transfer payment.

关 键 词：县际竞争 治理差异 财政激励 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学]