双向博弈:美国与叙利亚库尔德武装力量的委托-代理关系(2014~2020年)  被引量:5

Proxy Wars under Principal-Agent Bidirectional Game:A Case Study of the Relationship between the United States and Kurdish Armed Forces in Syria(2014-2020)

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作  者:文少彪[1] 刘中民[1] Wen Shaobiao;Liu Zhongmin

机构地区:[1]上海外国语大学中东研究所

出  处:《西亚非洲》2022年第4期115-138,159,160,共26页West Asia and Africa

基  金:2021年上海外国语大学校级一般项目(41004576)的阶段性成果。

摘  要:利用当地代理人武装打击恐怖主义是美国安全战略的重要组成部分。在叙利亚,由于担心深陷反恐战争的陷阱,美国拒绝部署大规模地面部队来应对“伊斯兰国”的威胁,而是转向“幕后领导”策略,利用库尔德武装执行地面战斗任务,但这种委托-代理关系未能维系下去。首先,利益匹配与“赋能”激励促成委托-代理关系。2014年“伊斯兰国”的崛起日益促成美国和叙利亚库尔德人的共同利益,美国逐渐加大对后者进行“赋能”激励,提升后者的积极性和作战能力。其次,利益分化与“去能”激励导致委托-代理关系产生分歧。当“伊斯兰国”被极大地削弱后,双方之间的利益分歧加剧,美国开始对叙利亚库尔德武装进行“去能”,以限制后者不断增长的实力和自主性。最后,监督困境导致委托-代理关系趋于瓦解。由于信息不对称和代理人武装碎片化的结构,美国很难对叙利亚库尔德武装施加有效的监督,致使后者存在懈怠和偏离行为的空间。随着打击“伊斯兰国”的行动进入尾声,美国不再顾及叙利亚库尔德人的利益,这迫使后者从美国的对手俄罗斯和巴沙尔政权那里寻求新的安全庇护,这种微妙的偏离折射出代理人战争的潜在隐患和代理关系的脆弱性。事实表明,代理人策略存在的利益分化、激励和监督困境始终是运作代理人战争的固有“软肋”。The use of local proxy armed forces to fight against terrorism is a significant component of US security strategy.Therefore,the Kurdish Armed Forces have become a major helper of the US Anti-ISIL campaign in Syria.This article places extra emphasis on the root causes of why the Principal-Agent( PA)relationship between the United States and Syria Kurdish Armed Forces shifts from close cooperation to gradual alienation.It uses the bidirectional game process of PA theory as a framework,and combines three analytical dimensions-interests,incentives,and supervision,to draw the following conclusions.First,the rise of ISIL in 2014 accelerated the formation of the common interests between the United States and the Syria Kurdish Armed Forces,and the United States gradually imposed empowerment incentives to the latter for more positivity and better combat capability.Second,when the ISIL was greatly undermined,the differentiation of interest between the two got intensified.The United States started to impose decapacitation incentives to Syria Kurdish Armed Forces to restrict its daily growing strength and autonomy.Finally,because of information asymmetry and the fragmented structure of proxy armed forces,the United States is limited in its ability to supervise and control the Syrian Kurdish Armed Forces,which resulted in slack and diversion from the principal’s regulation and commands.As the anti-ISIL campaign comes to its end,the United States becomes more reluctant to take Syrian Kurds ’ interests into account,which pushes the latter to seek new asylums from Russia and the Assad regime.This subtle slippage reflects the potential risk of proxy wars and the fragility of this PA relationship.

关 键 词:叙利亚战争 美国 叙利亚库尔德武装 委托-代理关系 双向博弈 “伊斯兰国” 代理人自主性 

分 类 号:D815.4[政治法律—国际关系] D871.2[政治法律—政治学]

 

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