忠诚协议制度化的法经济学考察  

A Legal and Economic Study on the Institutionalization of Loyalty Agreement

作　　者：侯学宾[1,2] 曲颢 Hou Xuebin;Qu Hao

机构地区：[1]吉林大学法学院 [2]吉林大学家事司法研究中心

出　　处：《法治社会》2022年第4期76-88,共13页Law-Based Society

摘　　要：忠诚协议意指约定夫妻之间违背忠实义务的一方应向另一方给付财产赔偿的民事协议。应不应当承认忠诚协议的法律效力,是一个需要在法经济学视角下被重新审视的问题。婚姻可以被视为一种符合经济效率原则的长期契约,长期契约的特性易导致婚姻不忠现象的发生。忠诚协议能够发挥担保功能与定价功能,提高婚姻不忠行为的法律成本。相对于刑事处罚制度和民事损害赔偿制度,忠诚协议制度具有自身的优势,这说明忠诚协议制度是法律规制婚姻不忠现象的制度备选。忠诚协议制度化要求明确规定忠诚协议的法律效力,并结合我国现行法律进行体系化考量,完成规范性建构工作。Loyalty agreement refers to the civil agreement that the party who violates the duty of loyalty between husband and wife should pay property compensation to the other party. Whether the legal validity of loyalty agreement should be recognized is a problem that needs to be re-examined from the perspective of legal policy of law and economics. Marriage can be regarded as a long-term contract in line with the principle of economic efficiency. Its own attributes easily lead to the breeding of marital infidelity. Loyalty agreement performs the function of guarantee and pricing, which increases the legal cost of marital infidelity. In the analysis of institution competition, the loyalty agreement institution is superior to the criminal punishment institution and the civil damage compensation institution, which shows that the loyalty agreement institution is an excellent choice for the legal regulation of marital infidelity. The institutionalization of loyalty agreement requires that the legal validity of loyalty agreement should be clearly stipulated,that the systematic consideration should be carried out in combination with China’s current legal system, and that the normative construction should be completed.

关 键 词：忠诚协议 忠实义务 婚姻不忠 法经济学 制度竞争 

分 类 号：D923.9[政治法律—民商法学] D90-059[政治法律—法学]