知觉信念的辩护——戴维森与麦克道威尔之争新解  

The Justification of Perceptual Beliefs——A New Interpretation of the Dispute between Davidson and Mc Dowell

作　　者：薛立伟 Xue Liwei

机构地区：[1]中国科学院大学人文学院哲学系

出　　处：《理论界》2022年第6期29-35,共7页Theory Horizon

摘　　要：知觉信念的辩护问题在当代知识论和心灵哲学中存在持续的争论。戴维森认为,知觉经验是个体持有知觉信念的原因而非理由,不能为知觉信念提供辩护;麦克道威尔则认为,知觉经验具备了关于周围环境特征的客观表征内容,能够为知觉信念提供辩护。实际上,两人观点的分歧比他们所认为的更大:首先,麦克道威尔认为,融贯论会导致知觉信念失去外部世界的限制,是对戴维森的误解;其次,虽然两人都拒斥单调的自然主义对知觉信念的解释,但给出的替代方案是截然不同的。并且,麦克道威尔对其概念论中的理论困难的回应不充分。因而,戴维森可以针对麦克道威尔的误解及理论困难予以更有力的反驳。The Justification of perceptual beliefs has been continuously debated in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of mind.Davidson believes that perceptual experience is the reason for the individual’s perceptual belief rather than the reason,and it cannot provide a justification for perceptual beliefs.McDowell believes that perceptual experience has an objective representation of the characteristics of the surrounding environment and can provide a justification for perceptual beliefs.In fact,the differences between the two views are greater than they think:First of all,McDowell’s misunderstanding of Davidson is that coherence theory will lead to perceptual beliefs losing the restrictions of the outside world;secondly,although both of them are reject the bald naturalism interpretation of perceptual beliefs,but the alternatives given are quite different.Moreover,McDowell’s response to the theoretical difficulties in his conceptualism was inadequate.Therefore,Davidson can refute McDowell’s misunderstanding and theoretical difficulties more forcefully.

关 键 词：知觉经验 知觉信念 融贯论 概念论 单调的自然主义 

分 类 号：B0[哲学宗教—哲学理论]