问询函监管、会计信息质量与分析师盈余预测  

Enquiry letter supervision,accounting information quality and analysts’earnings forecasts

作　　者：宋力[1] 张明尧 SONG Li;ZHANG Ming-yao(School of Management,Shenyang University of Technology,Shenyang 110870,China)

机构地区：[1]沈阳工业大学管理学院,沈阳110870

出　　处：《沈阳工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第4期350-357,共8页Journal of Shenyang University of Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：辽宁省教育厅项目(WJGD2020005)。

摘　　要：分析师盈余预测能帮助投资者进行决策,问询函发放能监督公司披露信息的准确性,有利于维护资本市场的稳定。以2017—2019年A股上市公司为样本,通过文献研究以及多元线性回归分析,全面研究问询函监管与分析师盈余预测的关系。研究结果显示:问询函监管能够提高分析师盈余预测的准确度;会计信息质量在问询函监管与分析师盈余预测准确度之间起到中介作用;会计师事务所出具的审计意见类型能够负向调节会计信息质量与分析师盈余预测准确度的关系。Analysts’earnings forecasts can help investors make decisions,and the issuance of enquiry letters can monitor the accuracy of information disclosed by companies,which is conducive to maintaining the stability of the capital market.Based on the sample of A-share listed companies from 2017 to 2019,the relationship between enquiry letter supervision and analysts’earnings forecast are comprehensively studied through literature research and multiple linear regression analysis.The results show that the supervision of enquiry letters can improve the accuracy of analysts’earnings forecasts,and the quality of accounting information plays an intermediary role between the supervision of enquiry letters and the accuracy of analysts’earnings forecasts.Audit opinions can negatively regulate the relationship between the quality of accounting information and the accuracy of analysts’earnings forecasts.

关 键 词：问询函监管 分析师盈余预测准确程度 会计信息质量 审计意见 多元回归 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学]