证监会随机抽查制度与上市公司规范运作  

CSRC’s Random Inspections and Standard Operations of Listed Companies

作　　者：滕飞 夏雪 辛宇[3] Teng Fei;Xia Xue;Xin Yu

机构地区：[1]中山大学马克思主义学院 [2]东北财经大学会计学院,辽宁大连116025 [3]中山大学管理学院

出　　处：《世界经济》2022年第8期109-132,共24页The Journal of World Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(72102244);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71772188)的资助。

摘　　要：随机抽查制度提高了市场监管公共执行机制的效率。本文聚焦资本市场,基于2016-2019年中国A股非金融行业上市公司数据,考察证监会随机抽查制度对上市公司规范运作的影响。研究结果表明,首先,证监会随机抽查具有提高证券监管效率的经济含义,当政策发布时,全部公司的市场反应显著为正;而发布抽查名单公告时,被抽查公司的市场反应显著为负。其次,证监会随机抽查具有监管治理作用,其能抑制公司的应计和真实盈余管理,提高信息披露质量;促使公司进行更多的内部控制缺陷整改,降低再次发生内部控制缺陷的概率。最后,证监会随机抽查具有违规惩戒效应,提高了违规行为被监管处罚的概率,降低了再次实施违规行为的概率。本文为证监会随机抽查制度的有效性提供了系统性的经验证据,具有较强的政策启示意义。The random inspection regime has been improving the efficiency of the public enforcement mechanism for market supervision.This paper focuses on capital market regulation and examines the impact of CSRC’s random inspections on the standard operations of listed companies.Based on data for Chinese A-share non-financial listed companies from between 2016 and 2019,the following results are drawn.First,the CSRC’s random inspection regime shows significant information content on improvement in regulatory efficiency.When the policy is published,the market reaction of all companies is significantly positive;when the random inspection list notice is released,the market reaction of the companies subject to random inspection is significantly negative.Secondly,there is a regulatory governance effect in the CSRC’s random inspections.The results demonstrate a significant improvement in the quality of information disclosure,as evidenced by the significant decrease in the accrual and real earnings management.Companies are also found to conduct more internal control deficiency rectifications when they are randomly inspected,and the subsequent likelihood of internal control deficiency recurrence significantly decreases.Finally,there is a punishment effect for violation of CSRC’s random inspections.When a company is randomly inspected,the likelihood that it will be punished significantly increases.However,after being punished,the likelihood that it will commit violations again decreases considerably.This paper provides systematic empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the CSRC’s random inspection regime,and has significant policy implications.

关 键 词：随机抽查 公共执行 市场反应 监管治理作用 违规惩戒效应 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]