姓氏与合作:乡村振兴战略下的公共品供给  

Clans and Cooperation:Provision of Public Goods in China’s Rural Revitalisation

作　　者：郭云南[1] 王春飞 Guo Yunnan;Wang Chunfei

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院经济系 [2]中央财经大学会计学院会计信息化系,北京100081

出　　处：《世界经济》2022年第8期180-204,共25页The Journal of World Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71773014、71772194)的资助。

摘　　要：本文基于中国1986-2008年30个省份347个村庄调查数据,考察村庄选举制度和姓氏血缘网络的互补关系对村庄公共品供给的影响和机制。研究发现,在前两大姓氏都有祠堂或家谱的村庄中,选举引入增加了公共品投资水平,而在其他姓氏网络类型的村庄中,选举的作用并不明显。机制检验发现,在选举引入后,具有祠堂或家谱的前两大姓氏更愿意在公共事务上进行合作与沟通,发动村民为公共品投资项目缴费。换言之,这种具有组织性的前两大姓氏网络发挥的协调功能对正式选举制度的治理效果起到了补充作用。本文为构建“党委领导、政府负责、社会协同”的公共品供给协作模式提供了有益参考。This work focuses on the role that culture and formal institutions can play in the provision of public goods in rural villages through their interactions,based on an unique panel data in 347 Chinese villages at 30 provinces from 1986 to 2008 years.The key finding is that when elections are introduced,villages with two larger ancestral halls or genealogies experience a much greater increase in the investment of public goods than villages without them.Further analysis of the mechanism indicates that elections significantly increase public taxes and fees for public goods in villages with two larger ancestral halls or genealogies than in those that without.These results suggest that the coordinating role that the two organized lineage networks have played in village governance is complementary to the effect of the formal electoral institutions.This paper also provides a new perspective in China’s rural revitalisation on how the effect of village elections on the provision of public goods varies with the presence of social networks.

关 键 词：村庄选举 姓氏合作 公共品供给 乡村振兴 

分 类 号：F323[经济管理—产业经济] D422.6[政治法律—政治学]