关键审计事项与管理层短视  

Key Audit Matters and Managerial Myopia

作　　者：李世辉[1] 伍昭悦 程序 Li Shihui;Wu Zhaoyue;Cheng Xu

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,410083

出　　处：《审计研究》2022年第4期99-112,共14页Auditing Research

基　　金：湖南省自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:2021JJ30882)的资助。

摘　　要：学术界对关键审计事项的信息增量作用开展了大量研究,然而鲜有文献从管理层的角度探索关键审计事项披露要求对其行为的影响。本文从管理层对于关键审计事项规制效应的贯彻程度,即管理层是会遵从新审计准则要求并最大化公司价值,还是会在新审计准则框架内攫取私利。结果表明在关键审计事项披露要求下,管理层会选择遵从审计监督减少其短视行为;然而,这种影响存在局部效果和替代效应,即在内部控制质量较高和外部机构投资者持股水平较低的情境下作用效果更为显著。此外,减少盈余操纵和提高风险承担水平是管理层采取减少短视行为策略的实现机制。本文丰富了关键审计事项经济后果的文献,为企业策略选择和审计改革推进提供参考。There has been much research on the incremental information of key audit matters.However,rare literature explores the strategies to deal with the disclosure requirement of key audit matters from the perspective of management behavior.This article explores the degree of management’s implementation of the regulatory effects of key audit matters,that is,whether the management complies with the requirements of the new auditing standards and maximizes the company value,or whether it seeks private interests in the framework of the new auditing standards.The results show that under the disclosure requirements of key audit matters,the management prefers to comply with the audit-based oversight and reduces managerial myopia.However,this strategy has partial and substitution effects,as it works better in the situation where internal control is of high quality and external institutional investors hold less shares.In addition,reducing earnings manipulation and increasing the level of risk-taking are the realization mechanisms for managers to adopt strategies to reduce managerial myopia.The research enriches relevant literature on the economic consequences of key audit matters,and provides a reference for the selection of enterprise strategies and the promotion of audit reform.

关 键 词：关键审计事项 管理层短视 监督效应 管理层行为 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学] F272.91[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51