子女结构与家庭商业保险:来自中国家庭金融调查的证据  被引量:7

Children Structure’s Influences on Family Commercial Insurance:Evidence from CHFS

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作  者:王韧 夏昱 徐珏瑶 许豪 徐徐[2] WANG Ren;XIA Yu;XU Jueyao;XU Hao;XU Xu(School of Finance,Hunan University of Technology and Business,Changsha 410205,China;School of Economics,Beijing Technology and Business University,Bejing 10048,China)

机构地区:[1]湖南工商大学财政金融学院,湖南长沙410205 [2]北京工商大学经济学院,北京100048

出  处:《中国软科学》2022年第7期183-192,共10页China Soft Science

基  金:国家社会科学基金项目(19BJY161);湖南省自然科学基金项目(2021JJ30197);湖南省教育厅科学研究重点项目(20A122)。

摘  要:运用中国家庭金融调查数据(2017)研究了子女结构对家庭商业保险参与的影响机制及效应。研究表明:拥有男孩或男孩比例增加将增大商业保险投资倾向,拥有女儿则与之相反;该作用在城镇农村家庭以及家庭各个生命周期阶段中均存在异质性;这种差异化影响主要源于不同子女性别结构家庭的禀赋差异,以及子女性别偏好作用于家庭其他决策后带来的间接效果。探究传统观念对家庭经济决策产生干预的可能途径,对研究家庭经济决策的非理性行为以及消除性别偏见、推动家庭商业保险健康发展有着积极作用。This paper uses the cross-sectional data of the China Household Finance Survey(CHFS) 2017 with the Probit and Tobit regression to discuss whether there is a gender preference for children in the behavior of households purchasing commercial insurance. The conclusions have shown that:(1) Owning boys and the increase of the proportion of boys will increase the investment tendency of family commercial insurance while owning daughters is the opposite;(2) The effect is heterogeneous in urban and rural areas, as well as each life cycle stage of families;(3) The differential impact is principal from the endowment difference of families with different children’s gender structure and the indirect impact of children’s gender preference on other family decisions. This paper explores a possible way for traditional ideas to intervene in family economic decision-making, which plays a positive role in studying the irrational behavior of family economic decision-making, eliminating prejudice, and promoting the healthy development of family commercial insurance.

关 键 词:子女结构 商业保险 家庭金融 性别偏好 

分 类 号:F842.0[经济管理—保险]

 

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