机构投资者投票顾问的引入与规制  

The Introduction and Regulation of Proxy Advisors for Institutional Investors

作　　者：张子学[1] ZHANG Zixue

机构地区：[1]中国政法大学民商经济法学院

出　　处：《中国政法大学学报》2022年第4期150-166,共17页Journal Of CUPL

摘　　要：近年来,在一些主要资本市场法域,机构投资者参与上市公司重大事项表决时,越来越依赖投票顾问的建议。投票顾问已经成为上市公司治理中重要乃至占据主导地位的市场力量,同时也显露出业务模式导致利益冲突、建议依据不透明、咨询质量堪忧、与上市公司缺乏沟通等弊端与系统性缺陷。本文详细介绍了投票顾问在美国的兴起及其原因、投票顾问面临的挑战、监管回应的博弈与反复,简要介绍了欧盟、英国、澳大利亚、印度、加拿大等法域对投票顾问的监管进展,提出了我国引入投票顾问并加以妥当规制的初步建议。In recent years,in some major capital market jurisdictions,institutional investors have increasingly relied on the advice from proxy advisors when voting on major issues of listed companies.Proxy advisors have become an important and even dominant market force in public corporate governance.At the same time,disadvantages and systematic defects such as conflicts of interest caused by business model,non-public advice basis,poor quality of consulting,and lack of communication with listed companies have emerged.This paper details the rise of proxy advisors in the United States and reasons for their rise,the challenges faced by proxy advisors,and the game and reversal of regulatory responses,and briefly introduces the regulatory progress of proxy advisors in the EU,UK,Australia,India,and Canada.The preliminary suggestions of introducing proxy advisors and properly regulating them in China are put forward.

关 键 词：机构投资者 投票顾问 引入 规制 

分 类 号：D922.291[政治法律—经济法学]