“p但我不相信p”为何荒谬?——从言语行为视角看摩尔悖论句  

Why “p, but i don’t believe p” absurd?:On moore-paradoxical sentence from the perspective of speech act

作　　者：王晴 WANG Qing(Institute of Philosophy,University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 102488,China)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院大学哲学院,北京102488

出　　处：《重庆理工大学学报（社会科学）》2022年第8期44-50,共7页Journal of Chongqing University of Technology（Social Science）

基　　金：中国社会科学院创新工程项目“人工智能重大哲学问题研究”(2021ZXSCXB04)。

摘　　要：摩尔悖论句是语言哲学、逻辑悖论、认知逻辑等领域关注的重要问题。从语言哲学的视角看,与言语行为相结合的摩尔悖论句“p但我不相信p”所产生的“荒谬性”已成为一个重要论题。经考察可发现,以往对此种荒谬性产生原因的分析可归为两种:一是由说话者心理状态中的冲突所致;一是由语言使用惯例所致。从语言的公共性特点看待这种荒谬性,后一种观点更为可取,这是因为具有公共性的语言并不以说话者心理等私人对象为基础。从言语行为这一视角考察摩尔悖论句,可知对荒谬性的解释存在不同层次,提醒人们在摩尔悖论研究中应注重层次区分。Moore-paradoxical sentence is an important issue of interest in the fields of philosophy of language, logical paradox, and epistemic logic. From the perspective of philosophy of language, the “absurdity” of moore-paradoxical sentence “p, but I don’t believe p”, which is combined with speech act, has become an important topic. An examination of previous analyses of the causes of the absurdity reveals that these analyses can be categorized in two ways: the absurdity is caused by the conflict in the speaker’s mental states;the absurdity is caused by language usage conventions. Viewing the absurdity from the perspective of the publicity of language, the study finds that it is possible to distinguish the two categories, and the latter is considered preferable, because the publicity of language is not based on speaker’s mind or other private objects. Examining moore-paradoxical sentence only from the perspective of speech act and revealing the existence of different levels among interpretations of the absurdity reminds that the distinction between levels should be emphasized in the study of moore’s paradox.

关 键 词：摩尔悖论句 言语行为 语言使用惯例 荒谬性 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学] B085