新零售模式供应链下生鲜农产品质量检测演化博弈  

Evolutionary Game of Fresh Agricultural Product Quality Testing under Supply Chain of New Retail Model

作　　者：张冰玉 刘红锁 刘佳虎 ZHANG Bing-yu;LIU Hong-suo;LIU Jia-hu(School of Economics and Management,Harbin University of Science and Technology,Harbin 150000,China)

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨理工大学经济与管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150000

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2022年第8期59-63,74,共6页Logistics Engineering and Management

基　　金：大学生创新创业项目:智慧生态“双型”新式民宿运营模式研究(s202110214058)。

摘　　要：为解决新零售模式供应链下生鲜农产品存在的质量安全问题,促进生鲜农产品质量检测的发展,构建新零售模式供应链下消费者与供应商之间的演化博弈模型,分析消费者和供应商的演化稳定策略,并通过Matlab仿真分析不同参数下影响消费者和供应商选择的因素。研究结果表明,消费者的购买成本、消费者潜在受损的利益、供应商检测产品质量花费的成本是影响消费者与供应商演化博弈行为的关键因素。因此,健全生鲜农产品的信息溯源系统,降低供应商检测生鲜农产品的质量检测的成本,完善对生鲜农产品供应商的奖惩机制有助于提高供应商检测产品质量的积极性和增加消费者的产品偏好,保障并提高生鲜农产品的质量。In order to solve the quality and safety problems of fresh agricultural products under the new retail supply chain and promote the development of fresh agricultural product quality testing,the evolutionary game model between consumers and suppliers under the new retail supply chain was constructed to analyze the evolutionary stability strategy of consumers and suppliers.And the Matlab simulation is used to analyze the influencing factors of consumers and suppliers choice under different parameters.The results show that the key factors influencing the evolutionary game behavior between consumers and suppliers are consumers purchase cost,consumers potentially damaged interests and suppliers cost of product quality testing.Therefore,improving the information traceability system of fresh agricultural products,reducing the cost of quality testing of fresh agricultural products spent by suppliers,and improving the reward and punishment mechanism of fresh agricultural products for suppliers can help improve the enthusiasm of suppliers to test product quality,increase the product preference of consumers,and guarantee and improve the quality of fresh agricultural products.

关 键 词：供应链 农产品 产品质量检测 演化博弈 新零售模式 

分 类 号：F322[经济管理—产业经济]