上市公司并购商誉与异常审计收费——基于年报问询函中介作用的分析  

M&A Goodwill of Listed Companies and Abnormal Audit Fees:Analysis Based on Annual Report Comment Letters’ Intermediary Role

作　　者：王文姣 傅超 WANG Wenjiao;FU Chao(College of Management,Sichuan Agricultural University,Chengdu 611130,China;Postdoctoral Research Station,Sichuan University,Chengdu 610065,China;School of Accounting,Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]四川农业大学管理学院,四川成都611130 [2]四川大学博士后科研流动站,四川成都610065 [3]杭州电子科技大学会计学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学学报》2022年第5期32-43,共12页Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目“企业战略性慈善行为:基于不确定性环境的保险策略”(71702041);浙江省哲学社会科学规划领军人才培育课题“区块链支撑的数字经济企业内部网络关键要素与实现路径研究”(22YJRAC05ZD-1YB);杭州电子科技大学省属高校基本科研业务费项目“并购商誉、外部监管与事务所审计风险研究”(GK199900299012-211)。

摘　　要：本文以2014-2020年我国A股上市公司为研究对象,从风险溢价补偿的视角考察上市公司并购商誉对异常审计收费的影响及作用机制。研究发现,公司并购商誉与异常审计收费显著正相关。基于非处罚性监管视角,本文发现上述关系的作用机制为:商誉有关的年报问询函在公司商誉资产正向影响异常审计收费的关系中发挥中介作用。上述结论在替换变量指标、考虑自选择偏差以及使用工具变量法克服内生性问题后依然稳健。本文进一步研究表明,在异常审计收费较高时,商誉资产越多的上市公司被出具非标准审计意见的概率越低,但上述效应在商誉相关年报问询函的影响下有所减弱,这在一定程度上印证了问询函监管的有效性。本文不仅丰富了公司并购商誉影响审计收费的研究,还从问询函监管视角深化了对两者之间作用机制的理解与认识,发现了问询函监管能进一步增强社会审计监督有效性的证据,为资本市场的会计风险监管提供了新的角度和依据。Taking China’s A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2020 as research samples, this paper investigates the influence of M&A goodwill of listed companies on abnormal audit fees and its mechanism from the perspective of risk premium compensation.The result shows that there is a significant positive correlation between M&A goodwill and abnormal audit fees. Based on the non-punitive supervision perspective, this paper finds that the mechanism of the above relationship is that the goodwill-related annual report comment letters play an intermediary role in the positive impact of the goodwill assets on abnormal audit fees.The above conclusions remain robust after replacing variable indicators, considering self-selection bias, and solving endogenous problems with instrumental variable method.A further study of this paper also finds that listed companies with higher M&A goodwill are less likely to be issued modified audit opinions when abnormal audit fees are higher.However, this tendency would be curtailed by the influence of the goodwill-related annual report comment letters, demonstrating the effectiveness of comment letter supervision to some extent.This paper enriches the literature on the influence of corporate M&A goodwill on audit fees and deepens the understanding and recognition of the mechanism between them from the perspective of comment letter supervision.It also finds evidence that comment letter supervision can further enhance the effectiveness of social audit supervision, which provides a new insight and basis for accounting risk monitoring in capital market.

关 键 词：并购商誉 异常审计收费 年报问询函 审计意见 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学]