碳中和目标下煤炭行业低碳发展演化博弈研究  

Evolutionary game of low carbon development of coal industry under the carbon neutrality objective

作　　者：王伟 WANG Wei(School of Management,Xi’an University of Science and Technology,Xi’an 710054,China)

机构地区：[1]西安科技大学管理学院,陕西西安710054

出　　处：《煤炭工程》2022年第8期186-192,共7页Coal Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“不确定条件下我国重要能源资源供给安全管理的理论与政策研究”(71273206);陕西省教育厅项目“基于EROI方法的陕北地区煤炭投入产出评价研究”(19JK0944);企业科研项目“陕北矿业公司高质量发展研究”(2019SMHKJ-B-J-26)。

摘　　要：运用演化博弈论研究了在碳中和目标下地方政府和煤炭企业之间复杂行为的互动机制,并采用数值仿真的方法对演化博弈模型和初步结论进行了验证。最后讨论了博弈双方初始概率选择对演化稳定策略的影响以及所选参数的灵敏度分析。结果表明:地方政府在推动煤炭行业低碳发展起关键作用;理想博弈策略组发生的概率与地方政府对煤炭企业的惩罚,补贴,煤炭企业的收益,政府额外收益成正相关,与监管成本,改进成本成负相关。并根据分析结果提出相关政策建议。The interaction mechanism of complex behaviors between local governments and coal enterprises under the carbon neutrality objective is investigated using evolutionary game theory.The evolutionary game model and preliminary conclusions are validated using numerical simulations.Finally,the influence of the initial probability choices of both sides of the game on the evolutionary stabilization strategy and the sensitivity analysis of the selected parameters are discussed.The results show that:local governments play a key role in promoting low carbon development in coal industry;the probability of occurrence of the ideal game strategy group is positively correlated with local governments’ penalties,subsidies to coal enterprises,coal enterprises’ revenue,additional government revenue,and negatively correlated with regulatory costs and improvement costs.And based on the analysis results,relevant policy recommendations are proposed.

关 键 词：碳中和 演化博弈 煤炭行业 低碳发展 

分 类 号：TD-05[矿业工程]