再论股东压制救济的公司立法完善--以《公司法》修订为契机  被引量:8

Re-discussing the Improvement of Corporate Legislation for Shareholders’Oppression Relief-Taking the Revision of the Company Law as an Opportunity

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作  者:李建伟[1] LI Jianwei(Civil Commercial and Economic Law School,China University of Political Science and Law,Beijing 100088,China)

机构地区:[1]中国政法大学民商经济法学院,北京100088

出  处:《北京理工大学学报(社会科学版)》2022年第5期48-58,共11页Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology:Social Sciences Edition

基  金:国家社科基金重大项目“营商环境法治化的制度架构与实现研究”(20ZDA044)。

摘  要:《公司法》为少数股东提供诸如股权回购、查阅权之诉等单项权利受侵害的救济措施,第20条“禁止滥用股东权利规则”也为股东侵害救济提供一般条款。但在复杂的公司治理面前仍显不足:一般条款未能对侵害股东复合型利益、合理期待利益等股东压制情形提供兜底性保护机制;诸如司法解散之诉等切断矛盾根源手段尚不能适用。以此次《公司法》修订为契机,可以将“股东压制”的概念引入《公司法》第20条,作为“滥用股东权利”的下位概念,并将“股东压制”导致的公司人合性障碍治理失灵列为提起司法解散之诉的法定情形之一,予以终局性救济。如此,《公司法》第20条“禁止滥用股东权利规则”的内涵得以完善,且股东压制的救济机制更为有效。The Company Law provides minority shareholders with remedies for infringement of individual rights,such as share repurchase and access lawsuits.Article 20,rule of prohibition shareholder rights abuse,also provides general provisions for relief for shareholder infringement,but is still inadequate in the face of complex corporate governance.On one hand,the general provisions fail to provide a bottom-up protection mechanism for infringement of shareholders’compound interests,reasonable expectation interests and other shareholder oppression situations.On the other hand,means such as judicial dissolution suits to cut off the root cause of conflicts are not yet applicable.Taking the amendment to the Company Law as an opportunity,the concept of“shareholder oppression”can be introduced into Article 20 of the Company Law as the subordinate concept of“abuse of shareholder rights”,and the failure of the governance of the company’s person-joining obstacles can be listed as a legal situation of the judicial dissolution of the lawsuit to get the final relief.In this way,the connotation of Article 20 of the Company Law,which stipulates that abuses of shareholders’right are prohibited,can be improved,and the relief mechanism of shareholders’oppression is more effective.

关 键 词:股东压制 控股股东 禁止股东权利滥用 司法解散 一般条款 

分 类 号:DF411.91[政治法律—经济法学]

 

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