基于博弈论对我国央地金融监管协调机制的制度解读  

System Interpretation on Coordination Mechanism of Central-Regional Financial Regulation in China Based on Game Theory

作　　者：李红坤[1] 岳媛媛 Li Hongkun;Yue Yuanyuan

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学金融学院

出　　处：《投资研究》2022年第5期4-24,共21页Review of Investment Studies

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“我国央地双层金融监管分权-合作模式的制度逻辑及构建路径研究”(19BZZ095)。

摘　　要：本文首先以有限理性的中央政府与地方政府为博弈主体,运用演化博弈方法研究金融监管协调机制下的央地策略选择的动态演化过程。其次,通过构建地方政府间的Stackelberg微分博弈模型,研究政策执行过程中的地方政府间的共谋问题。研究结果表明:在金融监管协调机制下,系统存在四种演化稳定策略和一种周期性波动,系统稳定均衡策略取决于决策双方采取各种策略的净收益;地方政府间的共谋现象是一种纳什均衡。This paper firstly,takes the central and local governments with bounded rationality as the main subjects,analyse the dynamic evolution process of the central government’s regulation strategies and the local government’s coping strategies selection under the coordination mechanism of financial regulation by means of evolutionary game.Then,this paper studies the problem of collusion between local governments in the process of policy implementation by constructing Stackelberg model.The findings show that the system has four kinds of stable evolutionary strategies and one kind of cyclical fluctuation under the coordination mechanism of financial regulation,the stable equilibrium strategies of the system depend on the net income of the decision-makers.The collusion between local governments is a Nash equilibrium.

关 键 词：央地金融监管 演化博弈 STACKELBERG模型 共谋 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F832.1