鸠山内阁时期“政治主导”改革失败原因探析——以委托代理理论为视角  

An Analysis of the Reasons for the Failure of“Politically Led”Reform in the Hatoyama Cabinet——From the Perspective of Principal-Agent Theory

作　　者：张伯玉[1] 杨佳腾 ZHANG Bo-yu;YANG Jia-teng(Institute of Japanese Studies,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing,100007,China;Department of Japanese Studies,University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Guangyuan,Sichuan,628012,China)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院日本研究所,北京100007 [2]中国社会科学院大学日本研究系,四川广元628012

出　　处：《日本问题研究》2022年第4期1-10,共10页Japanese Research

摘　　要：2009年9月,鸠山由纪夫成为日本首相,组建鸠山内阁,实施了诸多政治主导改革措施,意图实现消除政府执政党二元体制、重塑政官关系的目的。基于委托代理理论,从选民-政治家和政治家-官僚双重委托代理关系出发,对鸠山内阁时期民主党政权的“政治主导”改革进行了全面分析。鸠山内阁时期的政治主导改革损害了选民、政治家、官僚三方利益,产生了委托人信任危机、加剧了委托代理关系中的代理懈怠,增加了代理损耗。从选民-政治家委托关系来看,由于选民对鸠山内阁产生信任危机,鸠山内阁支持率急速下降,间接导致民主党2012年众议院选举失利。从政治家-官僚委托代理关系来看,政治家一味抵触省厅官僚,导致官僚的消极怠工与暗中抵抗,加速了鸠山内阁总辞职步伐。因此,可以认为鸠山内阁时期“政治主导”改革虽然取得了一定成效,但从结果来看仍以失败告终。In September 2009,Yukio Hatoyama became the Prime minister of Japan,formed the Hatoyama Cabinet and implemented a number of politically led reform measures,aiming to eliminate the dualism of the government and the ruling party and reshape the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats.Based on the principal-agent theory,this paper makes a comprehensive analysis of the“0 politically led”reform of the Democratic Party regime under the Hatoyama cabinet from the perspective of the dual principal-agent relationship between voters and politicians and between politicians and bureaucrats.The politically led reform during the Hatoyama cabinet harmed the interests of voters,politicians and bureaucrats,produced the trust crisis of the client,intensified the agency slack in the principal-agent relationship,and increased the agency loss.From the perspective of the voter-politician trust relationship,the support rate of Hatoyama’s cabinet declined rapidly due to the crisis of voters’confidence in Hatoyama’s cabinet,which indirectly led to the defeat of the Democratic Party in the 2012 House election.From the perspective of the principal-agent relationship between politicians and bureaucrats,politicians blindly contradict provincial bureaucrats,leading to the bureaucrats’passive sabotage and secret resistance,which accelerated the pace of hatoyama’s cabinet’s general resignation.Therefore,it can be concluded that the“politically led”reform during the Hatoyama administration achieved some results,but ended in failure.

关 键 词：委托代理理论 日本政治 民主党政权 政治主导 政治决策 

分 类 号：D73[政治法律—政治学] D77[政治法律—中外政治制度]