地方政府引导下的集群区域品牌协同创建演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Co-creation of Cluster Placing Branding Guided by Local Government

作　　者：张敏[1] 游雅思 谢合明[1] ZHANG Min;YOU Ya-si;XIE He-ming(School of Management,Xihua University,Chengdu,Sichuan,610039,China)

机构地区：[1]西华大学管理学院,四川成都610039

出　　处：《西华大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2022年第5期94-102,共9页Journal of Xihua University(Philosophy & Social Sciences)

基　　金：会计学国家级一流专业建设项目(RC2100001400);西华大学人才引进项目“地方政府引导下的集群区域品牌协同创建演化博弈分析”(w202329)。

摘　　要：集群区域品牌象征了一个区域内产品或服务的形象和声誉,对产业集群的升级和区域经济的可持续发展起着不可或缺的作用,但创建区域品牌并不是在所有地方产业集群内均能取得成效。借助演化博弈论,建立地方政府引导下的集群区域品牌协同创建演化博弈模型,从动态角度分析演化路径及其影响因素。博弈结果表明:地方政府补贴对集群企业协同创建区域品牌具有激励作用;大型企业投资份额、企业间的协同效应系数以及对“搭便车”企业惩罚力度的增加有利于区域品牌的协同创建,而总投资成本的增加会阻碍区域品牌的创建。The cluster place brand represents the main body and image of local products or services in a region, and plays an important role in the upgrading of industrial clusters and the sustainable development of local economy. However, the creation and development of cluster place brand is not effective in every local industrial cluster. Using evolutionary game theory, the researchers establishes a cooperative evolutionary game model of cluster place brand under the guidance of local government, and analyzes the evolution path and its influencing factors from a dynamic perspective. Results show that:(1) Local government subsidies have an incentive effect on enterprises in the cluster to jointly create the place brand;(2) The increase of the investment share of large enterprises, the coefficient of synergistic effect between enterprises and the punishment intensity of “free-riding” enterprises is conducive to the co-creation of place brand, while the increase of the total investment cost will hinder the development of place brand.

关 键 词：产业集群 区域品牌 协同创建 演化博弈 复制动态方程 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F061.5