跟投制度、承销费用与IPO盈余管理  

Co-investment System, Underwriting Fees and IPO Earnings Management

作　　者：陈晶 Chen Jing

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学会计学院,北京100070

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2022年第9期37-48,共12页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目“承销商跟投制度与IPO企业盈余管理:作用效果、影响因素与经济后果”(72102153)。

摘　　要：注册制下跟投制度是否能降低承销商机会主义行为、抑制IPO企业盈余管理,是需要关注的问题。本文以2019—2022年科创板和创业板实施跟投的上市公司为样本,研究了跟投制度对IPO企业盈余管理的影响,并考察了承销费用在跟投制度对盈余管理抑制作用中的影响。研究发现,承销商跟投比例与IPO企业上市前盈余管理程度显著负相关,但承销费用的提高削弱了跟投制度对IPO企业上市前盈余管理的抑制作用;此外,跟投制度对承销商市场份额较低、审计师声誉较高和公司治理水平较低的IPO企业上市前盈余管理有更显著的抑制作用。本文结论为全面推行注册制改革、提高上市公司盈余质量提供了理论支持。Under the registration-based system, we should notice the impact of the co-investment system on constraining underwriters’ behavior and inhibiting earnings management of IPO enterprises. Based on the samples of listed companies that implemented co-investment on the STAR and Chi Next market from 2019 to 2022, this paper studies the impact of co-investment system on earnings management before IPO, and examines the impact of underwriting fees on the inhibition of co-investment system on earnings management. The results show that the proportion of co-investment is significantly negatively correlated with the degree of pre-IPO earnings management. The increase of underwriting fees impairs the inhibitory effect of the co-investment system on the earnings management before listing. In addition, the co-investment system has a greater impact on the earnings management for IPO firms before listing with low-market-share underwriters, high-reputation auditors and low corporate governance. The conclusion of this paper provides theoretical support for the full implementation of the registration-based system and improving the quality of information disclosure of IPOs.

关 键 词：跟投制度 承销商 IPO盈余管理 承销费用 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]