监管独立与银行风险——来自银监局局长异地交流的证据  

Regulatory Independence and Bank Risk-taking:Evidence from the Rotation of BRAs'Directors in China

作　　者：刘玉海[1,2] 赵鹏 张丽 Liu Yuhai;Zhao Peng;Zhang Li(College of Economic and Social Development,Laboratory for Economic Behaviors and Policy Simulation,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China;School of Economics,Fudan University,Shanghai 200431,China;School of Management,Tianjin University of Technology,Tianjin 300384,China)

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济与社会发展研究院,300071 [2]南开大学经济行为与政策模拟实验室 [3]复旦大学经济学院,200431 [4]天津理工大学管理学院,300384

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2022年第6期126-146,共21页Nankai Economic Studies

基　　金：南开大学文科发展基金项目“双碳目标约束下中国能源偏向型技术进步的形成机制与经济效应研究”(ZB22BZ03ZZ)资助。

摘　　要：金融体系的稳健运行有赖于政府有效的金融监管,而金融监管独立性则是政府金融监管有效发挥作用的必要条件。本文以中国各省市银监局局长的异地交流作为刻画银行监管独立性程度提升的一次准自然实验,并采用双重差分方法评估了银行监管独立性程度的提升对商业银行风险承担行为的影响效应。研究发现,监管独立性程度提升具有显著的银行风险抑制效应;银监局局长异地交流的银行风险抑制效应存在一年左右的政策时滞,而且随着局长任职时间的延长呈现出先上升后下降的“倒U型”趋势;局长平行交流和垂直交流对银行经营风险的抑制效应均显著为正向,而对银行信用风险的抑制效应仅在局长垂直交流时显著;局长异地交流的风险抑制效应对没有跨区域经营或没有公开上市的银行影响程度相对更大;局长交流对银行经营风险的抑制效应主要来源于资本充足率的提高,而对银行信用风险的抑制效应则主要来源于资本充足率的提高和不良贷款规模的下降;银行监管强度提高不仅自身具有风险抑制效应,而且可以强化局长异地交流的风险抑制效应。This paper takes the rotation of directors of the Banking Regulatory Authority(BRA)as a natural experiment to measure the independence of the banking regulation,and evaluates the effect of regulatory independence on the bank risk-taking in China with difference-in-difference identification.The results show that,firstly,the promotion of banking regulatory independence has a significantly suppression effect on the bank risk-taking.Secondly,it takes about one year for the rotation of directors to take effect,and the risk suppression effect is nonlinear,which presents an inverted U-shape curve with the extension of rotated directors’tenures.Thirdly,there is some significant difference in the risk suppression effect between the horizontal rotation and the vertical rotation of directors.Fourthly,the suppression effect of rotated directors on the operational risk is mainly due to the increased capital adequacy ratio,while the suppression effect on the credit risk is mainly due to both of the increased capital adequacy ratio and the decline in the size of nonperforming loans.Furthermore,we also find that the promotion of banking regulatory intensity not only has its own risk suppression effect,but also can strengthen the risk suppression effect of rotated directors.

关 键 词：银行风险 监管独立 官员交流 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]