存在双向搭便车的双渠道最优定价与服务水平决策  

Optimal pricing and service quality decisions of dual channels in case of bidirectional free riding

作　　者：张爱凤 官振中[1] 何三明 Zhang Aifeng;Guan Zhenzhong;He Sanming(School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2022年第4期509-521,共13页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71572154);中央高校基本科研业务团队项目(26816WTD25).

摘　　要：考虑单个零售商相互独立经营的双渠道,基于消费者的渠道偏好和双向搭便车的行为,研究了双渠道各自的最优定价与服务水平联合决策问题,分别建立了双渠道实施价格歧视定价与否的两阶段定价和服务水平决策模型.运用消费者效用理论、最优化理论、博弈论等求解模型存在均衡解的条件和均衡解,并进一步探讨了消费者搭便车行为和价格歧视定价对渠道、零售商的影响.研究结论表明,消费者搭便车行为能够增加线上渠道的最优利润,降低实体渠道的最优利润;歧视定价降低了实体渠道的服务水平,不影响线上渠道的服务水平;在企业短期运营内(服务水平不变),价格歧视定价策略产生的影响:增加了双渠道第一销售期价格,降低了双渠道第二销售期价格,无法同时实现两个渠道利润的增加,在一定条件下能够增加零售商整体的最优利润.最后通过数值分析的方法验证了前述模型的有效性和可靠性.In a two-stage sales of a monopoly dual channel retailer with bidirectional free riding and price competition,this paper studies the discriminatory pricing and service quality decisions of dual channels.The optimal pricing and service quality decision-making models for the dual-channel with and without discrimi-nation pricing strategies are established respectively.Based on consumer utility theory,optimization theory and Nash game theory,the equilibrium condition of optimal pricing and service quality decisions and Nash equilibrium solution are given.The effects of free-riding and discriminatory pricing on channels are further discussed.Result shows that consumer free riding can increase online channel profit and reduce the profit of physical channels,and that discrimination pricing can reduce the service quality of physical channels but cannot affect the service quality of online channels.Comparative analysis of the models shows that,in the short-term operation of the company(the service quality is unchanged),price discrimination cannot increase the profit of the dual channels at the same time,but can increase the price of the first stage of the dual channel,and reduce the second stage price.Under certain conditions,it can increase the optimal profit of retailer.At last,the numerical simulation results show the effectiveness and reliability of the models.

关 键 词：双渠道 搭便车 价格歧视定价 服务水平 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]