学术期刊数据库的反垄断监管  

The Antitrust Regulation of Academic Journal Databases

作　　者：王伟 WANG Wei(Law School of Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China)

机构地区：[1]清华大学法学院,北京100084

出　　处：《现代法学》2022年第4期131-144,共14页Modern Law Science

基　　金：国家哲学社会科学基金项目“《著作权法》配套法规修订研究”(21@ZH006)。

摘　　要：大型学术期刊数据库通过电子文献的一站式交付,有效满足了全社会激增的版权付费使用需求,推动了知识资源的传播共享与再利用增值。但与此同时,头部数据库服务商寻购了海量的文献版权资源,实质性地锁定了下游用户并拥有了收取垄断价格的能力,引发了知识服务市场垄断的质疑。然而,我国反垄断监管机构表现出了极高的容忍度,未曾挑战大型数据库连年走高的订阅使用费要价,频频被指反垄断执法缺位。对此,监管者一方面需要采取一类更为直观的“不公平高价”认定标准,惩处大型数据库潜在的滥用支配地位行为;另一方面则应积极转向竞争导向型的监管思路,有序引导学术数据库市场形成竞争。通过限制优势数据库获取独占性版权许可、建设替代性公共学术数据库平台、扶持聚合式网络学术搜索引擎等措施,能够以较低成本维持学术数据库开放竞争的市场结构,消除知识服务市场被垄断的顾虑。The academic journal databases effectively promote the knowledge’s dissemination,sharing and reuse,through delivering massive journal documents.Meanwhile,the leading databases have obtained an extremely high market share by aggregating huge journal paper’s copyright licenses,which substantially locked down the downstream users and possessed the ability to charge a monopolized price.Up to now,Chinese Antitrust Agencies have not challenged the subscription fees charged by them,which was criticized for lacking of antitrust enforcement.Thus,the agencies should not only adopt a more intuitive“unfairly high price”identification standard,but also turn to a regulatory framework to promote competition.Through restricting their aggregation of exclusive copyright licenses,building alternative public academic databases and supporting opening academic search engines,the academic journal market might maintain a limited but beneficial competition,and eliminate concerns about monopoly in the knowledge service market.

关 键 词：学术期刊数据库 反垄断 中国知网 版权垄断 聚合式网络学术搜索引擎 

分 类 号：DF414[政治法律—经济法学]