基于不确定性约束条件的食物浪费行为研究  

STUDY ON FOOD WASTE BEHAVIOR BASED ON UNCERTAINTY CONSTRAINTS

作　　者：连大祥 高原[2] 刘晓鸥[2] LIAN Daxiang;GAO Yuan;LIU Xiaoou(Department of Economics,Business School,University of Texas,USA;School of Agriculture and Rural Development,Renmin University of China)

机构地区：[1]美国得克萨斯大学商学院经济系 [2]中国人民大学农业与农村发展学院,100872

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2022年第8期37-48,共12页Economic Theory and Business Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金委面上项目(71973146);国家社科基金重大项目(20&ZD164)的资助。

摘　　要：本文探讨了决策者食物利用能力的不确定性如何引起食物浪费,并比较了食物浪费税和私人信息干预这两个政策工具对食物浪费量和社会福利的影响。研究结果表明,消费者食物最优保有量决策一旦偏离其食物利用能力,就会引发食物浪费。虽然两个政策工具都可以有效地降低食物浪费,但是食物浪费税对社会福利的影响方向不确定,而私人信息干预却可以通过激发学习机制增强决策者对自身食物利用能力的认知,并降低不确定性,从而提高整体社会福利。This paper discusses how a decision maker’s uncertainties about food utilization causes food waste,and compares the impacts of food waste tax and private information intervention on food waste and social welfare.The results show that,food waste occurs when the amount of food utilization deviates from food inventory.Although the two policy tools can effectively reduce food waste,the impact direction of food waste tax on social welfare is uncertain,while private information intervention can enhance the cognition of decision makers on their own food utilization ability through stimulating learning mechanism and reduce uncertainty,thus improving the overall social welfare.

关 键 词：食物浪费 不确定性 食物利用 信息干预 

分 类 号：D922.16[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学] F812.42[政治法律—法学]