多维偏好视角下特大型项目极端争议决策的演化博弈研究  

Evolutionary Game Research on Extreme Disputes Decision-Making of Large Projects from the Perspective of Multidimensional Preference

作　　者：谭任 洪开荣[1] TAN Ren;HONG Kairong(Business School,Central South University,Changsha,Hunan410083,China)

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2022年第5期97-107,共11页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71671187)。

摘　　要：特大型项目关联主体在决策过程中受到多种行为偏好集合影响。鉴于此,在高质量发展背景下,基于行为博弈基本逻辑,运用演化博弈方法构建政府方、项目建设方及社会民众方的偏好集合极端争议决策演化博弈模型,解析项目决策主体复杂心理偏好、多维利益构成与行为演进变化。结果显示:政府方的奖惩力度越大,均衡越稳定;项目建设方的公平偏好越高,均衡越容易达到平衡;博弈三方的损失规避偏好越低,越容易达到最优均衡解。The subjects of large projects are affected by a variety of behavioral preference sets in the decision-making process.In view of this,under the background of high-quality development,the evolutionary game method is used to build an evolutionary game model of extremely disputes decision-making based on the preference set of the government,the project construction and the public,and analyze the complex psychological preference,multi-dimensional interest composition and behavior evolution of the project decision-makers.The conclusion shows that the greater the reward and punishment of the government,the more stable the optimal equilibrium is;The higher the fairness preference of the project owner,the easier the optimal equilibrium will be achieved;and the lower the loss aversion preference of the three parties in the game,the easier it is to achieve the optimal equilibrium solution.

关 键 词：特大型项目 极端争议决策 偏好集合 演化博弈 多维偏好 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]