“政府—企业”双重债务违约风险与财政政策有效性  

Dual Government-Enterprise Debt Default Risks and the Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy

作　　者：刘宗明[1] LIU Zong-ming(School of Economics and Management,China University of Petroleum)

机构地区：[1]中国石油大学(华东)经济管理学院

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2022年第8期44-62,共19页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“全球价值链‘欧美亚’异质不确定性对我国经济波动的影响与宏观治理策略研究”(批准号21BJL029);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助“经济危机场景下政府债务违约风险防范与财政整顿策略研究”(批准号22CX04017B)。

摘　　要：伴随全球经济不确定性增大和新冠肺炎疫情蔓延,中国经济发展面临的风险挑战明显增多,政府和企业债务违约风险愈加显著。在政府进行广泛财政干预的经济环境下,本文提出了一个新的理论框架来研究“政府—企业”双重债务违约风险对财政政策有效性的影响,通过构建包含政府和企业两部门债务违约风险的动态一般均衡模型,研究发现:财政刺激政策在带来经济扩张的同时,会增加政府违约风险并降低企业违约风险,但税收和支出政策对企业违约风险的影响存在较大差异,后者在中长期内会显著推高企业违约风险。反事实模拟发现,政府违约风险的存在或增强会削弱财政政策有效性,而企业违约风险在短期内抑制财政政策效果的同时,会通过道德风险机制增强中长期财政干预效果,这说明企业违约风险通过扭曲企业偿债预期产生经济扩张的逆效应。进一步研究显示,政府违约风险会带来社会福利净损失,而企业违约风险的出现或增强会通过改善企业福利状态带来社会福利改善,却给居民带来社会福利损失,这种以损害居民利益而获得的福利改善值得警惕和防范。最后,风险对冲机制模拟发现,银行部门的信贷风险利率加成机制和调整粘性机制对管控企业逆向激励产生显著效果。本文的研究结论对于“十四五”时期积极管控“政府—企业”双重债务违约风险、增强宏观调控有效性具有重要意义。With the global economic uncertainty and the spread of the COVID-19 crisis,the risks and challenges facing China’s economic development have increased significantly, and the dual government-enterprise debt default risks have become increasingly significant. This paper is of great value for fully understanding the interaction feedback of default risks and fiscal policies in the government and enterprise,improving the prevention and control capabilities of systemic risks,and strengthening the effectiveness of macroeconomic regulation and control.This paper proposes a new theoretical framework to study the impact of the dual government-enterprise debt default risks on the effectiveness of fiscal policy,and constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model covering the dual government-enterprise debt default risks. It is found that fiscal stimulus will increase the government default risk and reduce the enterprise default risk while bringing economic expansion. However,the impact of tax and expenditure policies on enterprise default risk is quite different,and the latter will promote the enterprise default risk in the medium and long term.Counterfactual simulation shows that the existence or strengthening of government default risk will weaken the effectiveness of fiscal policy,while the enterprise default risk will inhibit the effect of fiscal policy in the short term and enhance the effect of medium-and long-term fiscal intervention through moral hazard mechanism. This indicates that enterprise default risk will produce adverse effects of economic expansion by distorting corporate debt repayment expectations. Then,this paper explores the social welfare cost of the dual government-enterprise debt default risks. It is found that government default risk will bring about a net loss of social welfare;and the emergence or strengthening of the enterprise default risk will bring about improvement of social welfare by improving the welfare status of enterprises,but it will bring social welfare losses to residents.The contrib

关 键 词：政府违约风险 企业违约风险 财政政策 经济危机 宏观调控 

分 类 号：F120[经济管理—世界经济]