个人信息处理规则的法律经济学分析  

Legal and Economic Analysis of Personal Information Processing Rules

作　　者：姜保忠 来宇 JIANG Baozhong;LAI Yu(College of Criminal Justice,Henan University of Economics and Law,Zhengzhou 450046,China)

机构地区：[1]河南财经政法大学刑事司法学院,河南郑州450046

出　　处：《重庆邮电大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第5期57-65,共9页Journal of Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：最高人民检察院检察理论研究课题(GJ2020C35);河南财经政法大学民商经济法学院硕士研究生科研创新项目。

摘　　要：个人信息处理规则是信息保护制度的风向标,反映了制度在信息利用与保护之间的价值偏向。实现个人信息保护与利用的衡平,本质上是追求效益最大化的资源配置问题。法经济学中的边际效益理论以及静态博弈范式有助于对个人信息处理规则的法律效果作出鉴证。通过边际成本收益分析,信息处理规则中对主体、处理者以及信息的分类正视了不同情形下帕累托最优点的差异,提高了资源的配置效率。在静态博弈视角下,信息处理规则的确立规避了信息主体与信息处理者双方消极对立的囚徒困境,促进了信息要素市场的流通。针对实践中存在的一般个人信息保护过度以及敏感个人信息保护不足的问题,应通过动态化信息分类、督促企业数据保护合规等方式予以解决。Personal information processing rules are the wind vane of information protection system,which reflects the value bias between information utilization and protection.The balance of personal information protection and utilization is essentially a problem of resource allocation in pursuit of maximum benefit.Marginal benefit theory and static game paradigm in law and economics are helpful to verify the legal effect of personal information processing rules.By means of marginal cost-benefit analysis,the classification of subject,handler and information in information processing rules can face up to the difference of pareto advantage in different situations and improve the allocation efficiency of resources.From the perspective of static game,the establishment of information processing rules avoids the prisoner's dilemma of negative opposition between information subject and information processor,and promotes the circulation of information factor market.In view of the problems of excessive protection of general personal information and insufficient protection of sensitive personal information in practice,it should be solved by means of dynamic information classification and supervision of enterprise data protection compliance.

关 键 词：个人信息处理规则 保护与利用 边际收益 博弈 

分 类 号：D912.1[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学]