双平台市场排他性竞争仿真  

Simulation of the Market Exclusive Competition between Platforms

作　　者：郑文 张喆 朱静宜 Zheng Wen;Zhang Zhe;Zhu Jingyi(School of Management,Northeastern University at Qinhuangdao,Qinhuangdao 066004,China)

机构地区：[1]东北大学秦皇岛分校管理学院,河北秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《系统仿真学报》2022年第9期2098-2106,共9页Journal of System Simulation

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71473032)。

摘　　要：针对平台排他性竞争问题,引入2个竞争的PlatformsAgent、100个ConsumersAgent及300个SellersAgent,封装在BarriersModelSwarm表征的封闭市场环境,构建具有交叉网络外部性的双边市场系统。通过BarriersObserverSwarm交叉调用Agents属性信息与行为策略,生成虚拟连接类Order类和ArrayList类循环运行。触动Consumers/SellersAgent单边依赖度差异化条件,对比平台交易量、市场集中度和累积资产,还原双边市场竞争涌现的排他性。仿真结果表明,消费者与销售者依赖度增加,形成平台累积优势,平台间竞争演化出现排他性。探究平台排他性竞争演化,对双边市场监管具有前瞻性论域价值。As for the problem of an exclusive competition between the platforms,2 competing PlatformsAgent,100 ConsumersAgent and 300 SellersAgent are introduced and encapsulated into a closed market environment in BarriersModelSwarm.A two-sided market system is constructed with the cross-network externality.Through BarriersObserverSwarm,the Agents attribute information and behavior strategy are cross-called,and the virtual connection class Orderand ArrayList class in the Virtual Connection Classes are generated to run cyclically.The unilateral dependence degree of Consumers/SellersAgent is triggered,which restores the exclusive of the two-sided market competition in comparison with the platform transaction scale,market concentration,and platform cumulative capital.Simulation results show that the increasing dependence of Consumers/SellersAgent forms the cumulative advantage,which influences the evolution of the exclusive competition between the PlatformsAgent.Exploring the evolutionary and emergence of the exclusive competition in a two-sided market has prospectively holistic value in a two-sided market supervision.

关 键 词：双平台 单边依赖度 排他性竞争 SWARM仿真 双边市场 

分 类 号：F724[经济管理—产业经济] C93[经济管理—管理学] TP391.9[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]