担保圈危机、债务挤兑与区域风险治理  

Guarantee Network Crisis, Debt Run and Regional Risk Governance

作　　者：张一林 郁芸君 蒲明 Zhang Yilin;Yu Yunjun;Pu Ming

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院 [2]中山大学国家治理研究院新结构经济学研究中心 [3]中山大学高级金融研究院 [4]西南财经大学金融学院,611130

出　　处：《世界经济》2022年第9期83-105,共23页The Journal of World Economy

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目(21&ZD143)的资助。

摘　　要：本文对担保圈内不同银行之间的博弈进行分析,发现在企业互联互保所形成的担保网络中,当某一家企业发生债务违约后,为之担保的互保企业不仅新增了债务和债权银行,更因新债权银行和原债权银行集体挤兑企业债务而陷入债务违约和资金链断裂的困境,并由此引发新一轮的债务挤兑和资金链断裂,最终演变成具有“多米诺效应”的区域性金融危机和经济危机。在打破刚性兑付的政策背景下,相比于地方政府直接为企业提供政策性担保或通过行政命令干预银行续贷标准,允许担保网络中特定债权人优先获得偿付,可高效化解由债务挤兑所引发的担保圈危机,起到维护区域金融稳定和经济稳定的作用。The paper analyses the game between the different banks of the guarantee network, finding that when a certain enterprise of the guarantee network defaults on its debts, the member of the group that guarantees the defaulting enterprise faces new debts and adds creditor banks to its list since the debt repayment obligation has been transferred. Worse still, the new creditor banks and the group member’s original creditor banks collectively withdraw the loans, resulting in a shortage of liquidity and a default on debt repayment, which in turn can trigger a new round of debt runs and a rupture of the capital chain, and eventually evolve into a contagious regional financial crisis. The paper also points out that in the context of breaking the rigid repayment, the granting of seniority to certain creditors in the guarantee network can resolve the guarantee network crisis generated by debt run and play a role in maintaining regional financial and economic stability, which turns out to be a better settlement than directly providing policy guarantees for enterprises in crisis or requiring banks to relax loan renewal standards for enterprises in crisis through administrative orders.

关 键 词：担保圈 区域性金融危机 风险化解 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学] F224.32F275