多主体互动视角下工业企业低碳转型演化博弈研究  

Evolutionary Game Study on Low-carbon Transformation of Industrial Enterprises under the Interaction of Multiple Subjects

作　　者：丁一宁 崔立志 Ding Yining;Cui Lizhi(School of Business,Anhui University of Technology,Ma′anshan,Anhui 243032,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽工业大学商学院,安徽马鞍山243032

出　　处：《黑龙江工业学院学报（综合版）》2022年第9期98-106,共9页Journal of Heilongjiang University of Technology(Comprehensive Edition)

基　　金：安徽省自然科学基金项目“基于地方政府执行互动视角下雾霾治理促进工业绿色转型传导机制研究”(项目编号:2108085MG249)。

摘　　要：以工业企业低碳转型为背景,分析政府、工业企业和公众作为博弈参与主体的损益关系,讨论了三者行为策略趋于渐进稳定的条件,并在构建的演化博弈模型基础上,仿真模拟各主体在不同参数下的动态演化过程。研究发现,各主体行为相互影响且在一定条件下可收敛到理想的演化博弈稳定策略,其中影响工业企业低碳转型的主要因素有政府激励、企业转型的附加成本以及公众参与环保的积极性等。可考虑从完善政府政策制定,增强企业社会责任和健全公众环保参与机制方面,促进工业企业低碳转型。Based on the low-carbon transformation of industrial enterprises in China,this paper analyzes the profit and loss relationship between the government,industrial enterprises and the public as game participants,discusses the condition that the three behavioral strategies tend to be gradually stable,and simulates the dynamic evolution process of each subject under different parameters on the basis of the established evolutionary game model.It is found that the behavior of each agent influences each other and can converge to the ideal stable strategy of evolutionary game under certain conditions.Among them,the main factors affecting the low-carbon transformation of Chinese industrial enterprises include government incentives,additional costs of enterprise transformation and the enthusiasm of the public participation in environmental protection.Improving government policy making,enhancing corporate social responsibility and improving public participation in environmental protection can be considered to promote low-carbon transformation of industrial enterprises.

关 键 词：工业企业 低碳转型 复制动态方程 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F424.1[经济管理—产业经济] F124.5