风险感知驱动的垃圾焚烧发电项目利益主体博弈分析  被引量:3

Game theoretical analysis of stakeholders driven by public risk perception involved in a waste-incineration power generation project

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作  者:赵锐 俞阳 闵雪峰 黄雨欣 Zhao Rui;Yu Yang;Min Xuefeng;Huang Yuxin(School of Geosciences and Environmental Engineering,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 611756,China)

机构地区:[1]西南交通大学地球科学与环境工程学院,四川成都611756

出  处:《可再生能源》2022年第10期1302-1311,共10页Renewable Energy Resources

基  金:国家重点研发计划项目(2019YFC1905600);国家自然科学基金项目(41571520);四川省青年科技创新团队资助(2022JDTD0005);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2682021CX069,2682021ZTPY088)。

摘  要:垃圾焚烧发电项目易使公众产生不同程度的风险感知,进而诱发邻避事件。文章通过质性分析方法识别公众风险感知影响因子,构建了风险感知驱动的多利益主体动态博弈模型,基于系统动力学仿真探究了政府-企业-公众的行为策略变化。结果表明:臭气和烟气是风险感知的关键影响因子,升级环保管控措施、增加行政处罚力度以及提升公众接受度可产生三方博弈均衡,有助于促进企业-政府-公众三方共建、共治和共享有益态势的形成,推动邻避问题的化解。Power generation by waste incineration is prone to result in the public having different levels of risk perception,consequently inducing Not in My Backyard(NIMBY)events.This paper identifies the key influencing factors of public risk perception through qualitative analysis,by which a multi-stakeholder dynamic game model is constructed to explore the changes in government-enterprise-public strategic actions based on a system dynamics simulation.The results show that odor and smoke are the key influencing factors of risk perception.Upgrading environmental protection facilities,increasing administrative penalties and improving public acceptance can create a three-party game equilibrium,which is conducive to the formation of a beneficial situation regarding joint construction,co-governance and sharing,thus to promote the resolution of NIMBY issues.

关 键 词:风险感知 垃圾焚烧发电 利益主体 动态博弈 系统动力学 

分 类 号:TK6[动力工程及工程热物理—生物能] X321[环境科学与工程—环境工程]

 

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