用户与电商平台“大数据杀熟”的演化博弈  

Evolutionary Game of Big Data-Enabled Price Discrimination between Users and E-Commerce Platforms

作　　者：彭赓 张蕾 韩晨阳 PENG Geng;ZHANG Lei;HAN Chenyang(School of Economics and Management,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190)

机构地区：[1]中国科学院大学经济与管理学院,北京100190

出　　处：《科技促进发展》2022年第3期367-374,共8页Science & Technology for Development

基　　金：2020年国家自然科学基金面上项目(71972174):电商平台大数据杀熟的形成机制、效应和治理研究,负责人:彭赓。

摘　　要：考虑到电商平台利用其积攒的海量用户数据进行“大数据杀熟”,该行为具有的多样性和隐蔽性使得政府难以对其进行有效监管。本研究通过构建用户与电商平台的演化博弈模型,得出价格敏感型老用户和粘性较强新用户占比以及监管部门的罚金是影响演化博弈系统稳定状态的关键因素,而转移成本以及心理损失会影响用户选择“留存”策略的意愿。当演化博弈达到均衡时,电商平台和用户最终的选择为(杀熟,退出)和(不杀熟,留存)。为有效遏制平台“大数据杀熟”行为,用户应在保持对价格的敏感度的同时增强维权意识,政府也应当增大对该行为的处罚力度。同时平台应树立正确经营理念,对新老客户一视同仁,以达到博弈最优状态。Considering that E-commerce platforms use their accumulated mass user data for"big data-enabled price discrimination",and the diversity and concealment of this behavior make it difficult for the government to effectively supervise them,by constructing the evolutionary game model between users and e-commerce platforms,this study discovered that the proportion of price-sensitive old users and sticky new users and the fines of regulatory authorities were the key factors that affect the stability of the evolutionary game system,while the transfer cost and psychological loss would affect users’willingness to choose the"retention"strategy.When the evolutionary game reached equilibrium,the final choices of e-commerce platforms and users were(kill cooked,quit)and(don’t kill cooked,keep).In order to effectively curb platforms’"big data-enabled price discrimination"behavior,users should enhance their awareness of rights protection while maintaining their sensitivity to prices,and the government should also increase the penalties for this behavior.At the same time,the platform should establish a correct business philosophy and treat new and old customers equally,so as to achieve the optimal state of the game.

关 键 词：“大数据杀熟” 歧视定价 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F724.6[经济管理—产业经济] F224.32