网约车新政下平台和乘客的Stackelberg博弈模型及策略研究  

Stackelberg Game Model and Strategy Research between the Platform and Passengers under the New Rules of Ride-hailing Services

作　　者：雷丽彩[1] 高尚 LEI Li-cai;GAO Shang(Business School,Xiangtan University,Xiangtan 411105,China;School of Management and Engineering,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China)

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学商学院,湖南湘潭411105 [2]南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2022年第9期14-20,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(72171207);教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(19YJA630030)。

摘　　要：近年来,滴滴和优步等网约车平台的出现给城市居民出行带来了新的选择,然而随着新政的实施以及垄断巨头的酝酿诞生,网约车平台是否会降补贴提车价成为消费者最为关心的问题。文章构建网约车平台和乘客之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了网约车平台的补贴和抽成策略对乘客是否选择网约车出行的决策行为以及网约车市场均衡的影响。理论研究和仿真结果表明:网约车平台合理的补贴力度和抽成力度可以有效规避行政监管成本增加和乘客资源流失的风险,提高双方的收益,实现社会的帕累托最优。For the past years,ride-hailing services,consisting of Didi and Uber,have brought a new choice to the travel of urban residents.However,with the promulgation of new policies and the emergence of industrial monopoly giants in China,whether ride-hailing platform will drop subsides and improve prices becomes the most concern for consumers and the hot problem discussed at present.The Stackelberg model between platform and passengers is established to analyze the impact of platform’s strategy(subsidy and commission)on market equilibrium and the optimal trip decision behaviors of passengers.The theoretical research and simulation results indicate that the reasonable subsidy and commission mechanism can effectively avoid the risk of administrative cost increasing and the loss of passenger resources,and can increase revenue of the whole system and further achieve the Pareto optimal of society.

关 键 词：网约车服务 平台策略 STACKELBERG博弈 出行决策 

分 类 号：F570.6[经济管理—产业经济]