基于多方参与的“碳核查”业务权利寻租行为监管及控制研究  

The Supervision and Control of Rent-Seeking Behavior of CarbonVerification Business Rights Based on Multi-Party Participation

作　　者：王丹丹[1] 菅利荣[1] 付帅帅 WANG Dan-dan;JIAN Li-rong;FU Shuai-shuai(College of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing 211106,China;School of Economics and management,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China)

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210016 [2]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京211189

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2022年第9期225-231,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(2019SJZDA036);国家自然科学青年基金资助项目(72101109)。

摘　　要：针对“碳核查”业务权利寻租问题,考虑政府、控排企业及第三方核查企业对其治理的影响,运用演化博弈理论分析各参与主体在“碳核查”业务权利寻租问题治理过程中的决策行为。研究结果表明:“碳核查”业务权利寻租行为的发生受各主体不同决策行为的共同作用,如何约束控排企业的行为是解决“碳核查”业务权利寻租问题的关键;中低强度的复查抽检率无法有效约束控排企业的寻租行为,而高复查抽检率则可有效约束控排企业的寻租行为;因寻租成本不同,控排企业及第三方核查企业对政府惩罚力度的敏感性不同;中高强度的复查率及惩罚力度,有助于降低控排企业及第三方核查企业权力寻租行为的发生。For the rent-seeking problem of“carbon verification”business rights,we consider the supervision and influence of the government,emission control companies,and third-party verification companies.An evolutionary game model is established to explore the evolutionary equilibrium of the governance of“carbon verification”business rights rent-seeking behavior in different situations strategies.The results show that the rent-seeking behavior of carbon verification business rights is affected by the different decision-making behaviors of various entities.How to restrain and control the behavior of enterprises is the key to solving the problem of“carbon verification”business rights rent-seeking.The recheck and random inspection rate cannot effectively restrict the rent-seeking behavior of the emission control companies,while the high re-check random inspection rate can effectively restrict the rent-seeking behavior of the emission control companies.Due to the different rent-seeking costs,the sensitivity of the emission control enterprises,and the third-party verification enterprises to the government’s punishment is different.Medium and high-intensity review rates and punishment intensity are helpful to reduce the possibility of power rent-seeking by emission control enterprises and third-party verification enterprises.

关 键 词：碳核查 多方博弈 权利寻租 监管控制 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]