董事提名权:理论基础、路径选择与制度建构  

Director Nomination Rights:Theoretical Basis,Path Selection,and System Construction

作　　者：沈朝晖[1] 张然然 Shen Zhaohui;Zhang Ranran

机构地区：[1]清华大学法学院,北京100084

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2022年第10期69-79,共11页Securities Market Herald

摘　　要：董事提名权制度的缺位是我国现行公司法的法律漏洞。研究发现,董事提名权的规制路径分为强制性规范与完全章程自治两类。前者典型如美国北达科他州公司法;后者典型如美国示范商事公司法以及特拉华州公司法。美国证监会曾尝试通过全国统一公司法的方式,强制推行董事提名权,但以被法院宣告无效告终。基于股权集中状况下的少数股东保护需要,中国应采取强制性规范和有限章程自治的折中模式。在制度上对股东提案权和董事提名权进行区分,在《公司法(修订草案)》(二次审议稿)中对董事提名权作体系化的特别规定;允许不同类型的公司通过公司章程在董事提名权特别法规定的基础上,进行不同程度的有限章程自治。The absence of the system of director nomination rights is a legal loophole of the current Company Law in China.It shows that the regulatory path of director nomination rights is divided into two categories:mandatory regulation and full charter autonomy.Taking the U.S.as an example,North Dakota has adopted the former,while Delaware and MBCA have adopted the latter.The SEC attempted to promote a national Company Law and enforce director nomination rights,but it ended up being invalidated by the court.Due to the need to protect the minority shareholders from concentrated equity,China should adopt a compromise model of mandatory regulation and limited charter autonomy.Distinguish shareholders’rights to propose and rights to nominate directors,and provide systematical special provisions for director nomination rights in Company Law(Revised Draft)(Second Review Draft).Allow different types of companies to have different degrees of limited charter autonomy based on the special provisions for director nomination rights.

关 键 词：董事提名权 股东提案 股东参与 有限章程自治 

分 类 号：DF411.91[政治法律—经济法学]