反对动物信念!  

Animals Cannot Have Beliefs

作　　者：刘小涛[1] LIU Xiaotao

机构地区：[1]上海大学哲学系

出　　处：《哲学分析》2022年第5期115-128,198,共15页Philosophical Analysis

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“动物行为的心智主义解释研究”(项目编号:22BZX023)。

摘　　要：动物是否有信念?人们对于这个问题没有一致意见。一种区别于既有论证的解答思路是:首先,给出一些实例,表明这些实例是信念报道的典型案例;其次,论证这类实例才是真实的信念状态报道,而且从真实信念的突出特征来看,动物不可能拥有信念;最后,通过对新近的支持动物信念的论证加以讨论,来表明它何以未能成功。Can animals have beliefs? The question has been a persistent one in the philosophical literature. This paper develops a new argument against animal belief. The form of the argument is as follows: First, I shall state several cases of belief ascription, and show that there are numerous cases of this kind of belief report. Second, I’ll argue that these cases are genuine beliefs indeed while some other cases are not, and since genuine belief states presuppose a complex mental state with inconclusive information or doubtful evidences, all animals simply couldn’t have them due to their limited mental abilities. Finally, I’ll rehearse a recent argument for animal belief, and conclude that it fails at some points.

关 键 词：动物 信念 心智状态 

分 类 号：B15[哲学宗教—世界哲学]