Horizontal Mergers between Asymmetric Low-Carbon Manufacturers  

作　　者：Xiaogang Lin Kangning Jin Wenhui Fu Qiang Lin 

机构地区：[1]School of Management,Guangdong University of Technology Guangzhou 510520,China [2]School of Economics and Management,South China Normal University,Guangzhou 510006,China

出　　处：《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》2022年第5期619-647,共29页系统科学与系统工程学报（英文版）

基　　金：This paper was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.72001048 and 72102080;the Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation under Grant Nos.2019A1515011767,2019A1515110848,2021A1515011969,and 2021A1515011876;the Planning Projects of Philosophy and So-cial Science of Guangdong under Grant No.GD19YGL12.

摘　　要：Mergers have become an important means for low-carbon manufacturers to improve their efficiency and competitiveness.This paper studies the impact of horizontal mergers between asymmetric low-carbon manufacturers on product diversity,profits,consumer surplus,and the environment.In the premerger model,we consider two asymmetric manufacturers in terms of market potential that produce two products and compete on prices and carbon emissions.In the postmerger model,the two asymmetric manufacturers merge into one firm.The merged manufacturer can either continue to produce two products and collude on both products'prices and carbon emissions or enjoy both production and green technology investment cost savings to produce only one product.Our result suggests that when the merged manufacturer produces two products,the merger does not necessarily lead to higher prices,which stands in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom.Furthermore,the merger always benefits the manufacturer but harms consumers.When the merged manufacturer chooses to produce only one product,however,we confirm that the merger can lead to a win-win-win outcome,i.e.,the manufacturer,customers,and environment all become better off if either the production or investment savings are salient.The conventional wisdom shows that salient costing savings lead to price reduction.Nevertheless,we show that the merged manufacturer can charge consumers higher prices to provide lower-emission products.In addition,we show that improving investment(production)cost savings is more effective for the merged manufacturer if these two cost savings are salient(not salient).Finally,the merged manufacturer should not reduce diversity if these two cost savings are relatively low because the profit and consumer surplus may be simultaneously lower.We also extend our base model to the case where there exist three manufacturers in the premerger model and the merged firm still operates in a competitive market.

关 键 词：Game theory asymmetric horizontal merger low-carbon manufacturing price and emission collusions productionand investmentcost synergies 

分 类 号：F426[经济管理—产业经济]