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作 者:李艳婷 张翠华[1] 马勇 李春雨[1] LI Yanting;ZHANG Cuihua;MA Yong;LI Chunyu(School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang,Liaoning 110169,China)
出 处:《工业工程与管理》2022年第4期179-188,共10页Industrial Engineering and Management
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771044);沈阳市哲学社会科学专项资金资助项目(SZ202008L)。
摘 要:考虑由两个线下服务商和一个线上平台构成的“线上下单+线下消费”O2O供应链,研究服务质量控制与协调问题。分别构建服务商竞争和供应链集中决策下服务质量控制模型,求解服务商的最优价格、服务质量和线上平台的最优营销努力决策。对比两种情形下的均衡利润,发现服务商竞争加剧了双重边际化。在此基础上,对服务商联盟下服务质量协调策略进行探讨。结果表明,服务商联盟始终能够提升线上平台的营销努力,且能够协调供应链成员的收益,但仅当利润分配系数较大时才能够提升服务质量水平。In an online to offline(O2O)supply chain consisting of two offline service providers and an online platform,service quality control and coordination were explored. By constructing service quality control models under service provider competition and supply chain centralized decisionmaking,respectively,the optimal pricing and service quality decisions of offline service providers along with the optimal marketing effort decision of the online platform were obtained. Comparing the equilibrium profits in the two scenarios,it is found that service provider competition exacerbates double marginalization. On this basis,the service quality coordination model based on service provider alliance was constructed. The results show that service provider alliance can always improve the marketing effort of the online platform and coordinate the revenue of supply chain members,but only when the profit distribution coefficient is large,it can improve the level of service quality.
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